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Resumo
Ao longo dos anos, a preocupac¸a˜o com a Ciber Seguranc¸a (a protec¸a˜o de sistemas, re-
des e de informac¸o˜es num ciber espac¸o) nas grandes empresas tem vindo a aumentar, isto
porque, atualmente a maioria das organizac¸o˜es depende de dados informatizados e par-
tilham grandes quantidades de informac¸a˜o por todo o globo, tornando-se em alvos mais
fa´ceis para muitas formas de ataque. Consequentemente, um ciberataque pode prejudicar
o nome e a reputac¸a˜o de uma empresa, resultando na perda de vantagem competitiva,
criando um incumprimento legal / regulamentar e causando danos financeiros.
De modo a evitar um possı´vel comprometimento nas infraestruturas de uma organizac¸a˜o,
e´ necessa´rio tomar medidas de precauc¸a˜o, isto e´, fazer uma ana´lise e gesta˜o dos riscos a
que uma empresa esta´ exposta e assim delinear uma estrate´gia, de maneira a minimizar,
mitigar e / ou anticipar ataques.
A Portugal Telecom, conhecida tambe´m por PT Portugal ou Grupo PT, tratando-se da
maior operadora de telecomunicac¸o˜es em Portugal, na˜o descura da preocupac¸a˜o com a
Ciber Seguranc¸a. Como tal, esta possui uma direc¸a˜o dedicada a` seguranc¸a e privacidade
da informac¸a˜o, a Direc¸a˜o de Cyber Security and Privacy (DCY).
Para que haja uma protec¸a˜o ciber resiliente nas infraestruturas / ativos da PT, a DCY
divide-se em diferentes operac¸o˜es:
• Cyber Security Governance: responsa´vel pela gesta˜o das operac¸o˜es / programas de
Ciber Seguranc¸a da DCY, incutindo objetivos a cada uma das operac¸o˜es;
• Cyber Security Operations: responsa´vel pela resposta a incidentes;
• Cyber Watch: responsa´vel pela ana´lise proativa de riscos, isto e´, identificac¸a˜o dos
va´rios ativos de informac¸a˜o que podem ser afetados por um ciberataque e monitor-
izar continuamente o ambiente de risco.
O projeto ”Unified Cyber Threat Intelligence” encontra-se dentro da operac¸a˜o de Cy-
ber Watch da DCY e esta´ a ser desenvolvido na Portugal Telecom, no aˆmbito da disciplina
PEI (Projeto em Engenharia Informa´tica) do Mestrado em Informa´tica (MI) da Faculdade
de Cieˆncias da Universidade de Lisboa (FCUL).
A Cyber Watch e´ composta por diferentes a´reas, como por exemplo, Cyber Higiene,
Cyber Awareness ou Cyber Intelligence, de maneira a que a ana´lise proativa de riscos seja
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o mais eficaz possı´vel. O foco deste projeto dentro da Cyber Watch insere-se dentro da
Cyber Intelligence.
A Cyber Intelligence e´ um tipo de informac¸a˜o que fornece a uma organizac¸a˜o su-
porte nas deciso˜es, levando a uma vantagem estrate´gica proporcionando aos utilizadores
informac¸o˜es constantemente atualizadas sobre possı´veis fontes de ataque.
No contexto da Portugal Telecom, a Cyber Intelligence decompo˜e-se em diferentes
ramificac¸o˜es, sendo as mais importantes para este projeto as fontes de risco (risky sources),
estas referem-se a todos eventos ocorridos na Internet no geral e os alvos comprometidos
(compromised targets), tratando-se dos eventos que ocorreram dentro da organizac¸a˜o.
O objetivo principal deste projeto e´ a implementac¸a˜o de uma arquitetura escala´vel
para a recolha, ana´lise, remoc¸a˜o de duplicados, classificac¸a˜o, etiquetagem e filtragem de
Cyber Intelligence Events, sendo estes aplicados no contexto de organizac¸o˜es, unidades
de nego´cio, infraestruturas, ativos ou atores. Desta forma, sera´ possı´vel realizar uma
ana´lise forense aos Cyber Intelligence Events recolhidos, de modo a que haja uma melhor
compreensa˜o sobre o tipo de ataques a que as organizac¸o˜es esta˜o expostas.
Um evento, no contexto da Cyber Watch da Portugal Telecom, trata-se de um facto ou
ocorreˆncia observa´vel na Internet pu´blica (envolvendo enderec¸os IP e / ou Fully Qualified
Domain Names (FQDNs)), onde este aconteceu num certo perı´odo de tempo. Para o pro-
cessamento deste tipo de eventos utilizar-se-a´ o IntelMQ. Este trata-se de uma plataforma
para recolher e processar feeds de seguranc¸a, isto e´, correntes de informac¸a˜o composta
por factos e evideˆncias de que um certo evento aconteceu, como por exemplo, enderec¸os
IP ou domı´nios que esta˜o envolvidos em atividades maliciosas.
O IntelMQ tem como objetivo principal ajudar analistas de ciber seguranc¸a a recolher
e processar Cyber Intelligence Events permitindo o redirecionamento / envio da informac¸a˜o
tratada para outros sistemas. Para que um evento IntelMQ seja va´lido sa˜o necessa´rios cer-
tos requisitos para que este fac¸a sentido. Para tal, os requisitos mı´nimos sa˜o:
• O nome da Feed de Seguranc¸a onde o IntelMQ foi coletar o evento;
• O tipo de evento que foi encontrado, por exemplo, spam ou malware;
• A taxonomia do evento, por exemplo, Conteu´do Abusivo (podera´ estar associado
a spam) ou Co´digo Malicioso (podera´ estar associado a malware);
• O tempo de origem, a hora e data reportados por uma fonte de informac¸a˜o (feed);
• O tempo de observac¸a˜o, a hora e data em que o IntelMQ processou o evento.
Adicionalmente, um evento IntelMQ devera´ conter pelo menos um dos seguintes campos:
• IP de origem, o enderec¸o IP observado que iniciou uma ligac¸a˜o;
• FQDN de origem, o nome DNS relacionado a um host de onde originou a ligac¸a˜o;
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• URL de origem, refere-se a um recurso mal-intencionado onde a sua interpretac¸a˜o
e´ definida pelo tipo de abuso, por exemplo, um URL em que o abuso seja do tipo
phishing refere-se a um recurso de phishing;
• Conta de origem, nome de uma conta ou um enderec¸o de e-mail relacionado com
a origem de um evento.
A recolha e filtragem de Cyber Intelligence Events sera´ direcionada a entidades-alvo
e sera´ obtida atrave´s de diferentes fontes de informac¸a˜o, como por exemplo, open-source
/ paid intelligence feeds. Para este projeto foram utilizadas mais de trinta fontes de
informac¸a˜o. Segue-se um pequeno exemplo de fontes ja´ existentes no IntelMQ:
• Abuse.ch Ransomware Tracker: fornece listas de FQDNs, URLs e enderec¸os IP
que foram utilizados por diversas famı´lias de ransomware;
• PhishTank: fornece informac¸o˜es relacionadas com tentativas de phishing;
• VXVault: fornece listas de enderec¸os IP e de FQDNs que esta˜o envolvidos em
atividades maliciosas.
As fontes de informac¸a˜o ira˜o sustentar o IntelMQ e este, por sua vez, fara´ a remoc¸a˜o
de eventos duplicados (deduplication), classificac¸a˜o, etiquetagem e filtragem de todos os
dados recebidos.
Para a recolha de informac¸a˜o direcionada a`s entidades-alvo foi necessa´rio, primeira-
mente, observar e mapear (scouting / mapping) estas entidades, de modo a obter os atrib-
utos / campos mais relevantes de cada entidade, tal como, enderec¸os IP pu´blicos (IPv4 e
IPv6), FQDNs, entre outros. Apo´s a identificac¸a˜o destes campos, foi possı´vel direcionar
a filtragem de informac¸a˜o utilizando o IntelMQ.
Para o scouting e mapping de cada entidade-alvo sera´ utilizado o Maltego. Este trata-
se de um sistema interativo de data mining, que constro´i gra´ficos direcionados para a
ana´lise de correlac¸a˜o de dados (link analysis). O Maltego e´ utilizado para investigac¸o˜es
online para encontrar relac¸o˜es entre diferentes pedac¸os de informac¸a˜o de diversas fontes
localizadas na Internet.
Com o Maltego e´ possı´vel criar ”case-files” atrave´s de uma representac¸a˜o gra´fica de
cada entidade-alvo com os atributos mais relevantes de cada uma. Estas representac¸o˜es
gra´ficas conteˆm agregac¸o˜es e relac¸o˜es de informac¸a˜o relativas a eventos direcionados a`
entidade-alvo.
Apo´s o scouting e mapping e apo´s a definic¸a˜o dos atributos mais relevantes de cada
entidade-alvo, foi possı´vel direcionar a recolha de Cyber Intelligence Events no IntelMQ.
Este foi configurado atrave´s de um programa Ruby (desenvolvido ao longo deste projeto),
denominado ”intelmq configurations generator.rb”. O programa utiliza os metadados
recolhidos durante a fase de scouting, de modo a, reescrever os ficheiros de configurac¸a˜o
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do IntelMQ e gerando regras de filtragem, consoante a gama de enderec¸os IP e / ou
FQDNs do conjunto de entidades-alvo. Os eventos sa˜o filtrados de acordo com as car-
acterı´sticas de cada entidade-alvo, e sa˜o enviados em tempo-real para ficheiros que repre-
sentam o universo de eventos de cada entidade, assim como para a plataforma Hidra, que
permite a ana´lise forense dos eventos filtrados.
Palavras-chave: ciber seguranc¸a, ciber inteligeˆncia, eventos, incidentes, ciberataques,
fontes de informac¸a˜o
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Abstract
Over the years to the present day, the concern around Cyber Security in organisations
has increased substantially, because, most of the organisations rely on digitized informa-
tion and share large amounts of data across the globe, becoming easier targets for many
forms of attack. A cyber attack can damage an organisation’s name and reputation, and
can also result in loss of competitive advantage, create legal / regulatory noncompliance
and cause steep financial damage.
In order to avoid a possible attack in an organisation’s infrastructure is necessary to
develop a strategy for the collection, analysis and correlation of information. In this way,
it will be possible to better understand the type of attacks that an organisation might be
exposed to, and in the future predict these attacks.
The main goal of this project was the development of a scalable architecture to collect,
deduplicate, classificate, tag, filter and analyse Cyber Intelligence Events and applying
them into the context of organisations, business units, infrastructures, assets and actors.
It was necessary to collect and process security feeds, which are streams of informa-
tion consisting of facts and evidences that a certain event occurred, such as IP addresses
or domains that were involved in malicious activities - Cyber Intelligence Events.
The Cyber Intelligence Events were filtered, according to a group of attributes com-
posed by IP addresses, URLs and FQDNs of seven target-entities. The events were sent
to an analysis platform, allowing to forensically analyse them, to better understand what,
how and who performed the attack.
Keywords: cyber security, cyber intelligence, events, incidents, cyberattacks,
intelligence feeds
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Over the years, the concern with Cyber Security (the protection of systems, networks
and information in a cyberspace) in large companies has increased. Nowadays, most of
organisations rely on digitized information and share large amounts of data accross the
globe, becoming easier targets for many forms of attack. Consequently, a cyber attack
may harm a company’s name and reputation, resulting in loss of competitive advantage,
creating a legal / regulatory breach and causing financial damage.
In order to avoid a possible attack in the organisation’s infrastructures, it is necessary
to take precautionary measures, in other words, to carry out an analysis and risk manage-
ment, regarding the threats that a company is exposed to and thus outline a strategy in
order to minimise, mitigate and / or anticipate attacks.
Portugal Telecom, also known as PT Portugal or PT Group, being the largest telecom-
munications service provider in Portugal, is aware of the concern with Cyber Security. PT
Portugal has a department dedicated to security and privacy of information, the Direc¸a˜o
de Cyber Security and Privacy (DCY).
For the purpose of having a resilient cyber protection in PT’s infrastructures / assets,
the DCY is divided into three different operations, as seen in figure 1.1:
• Cyber Security Governance: responsible for the management of DCY’s Cyber Se-
curity operations / programs, incorporating goals for each operation;
• Cyber Security Operations: responsible for incident response;
• Cyber Watch: responsible for proactive risk analysis, in other words, identification
of assets that may be affected by a cyberattack and continuously monitor the risk
environment.
1
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Figure 1.1: DCY’s operations
The project ”Unified Cyber Threat Intelligence” is part of the Cyber Watch opera-
tion of DCY and is being developed at Portugal Telecom, within the scope of PEI (Projeto
em Engenharia Informa´tica) subject of MI (Mestrado em Informa´tica) of FCUL (Facul-
dade de Cieˆncias da Universidade de Lisboa).
Cyber Watch is composed by different areas as seen on figure 1.2, in this way, the
proactive risk analysis will be as effective as possible. The focus of this project inside
Cyber Watch is within Cyber Intelligence.
Figure 1.2: The Different Areas of Cyber Watch
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Cyber Intelligence is a type of information which provides an organisation with deci-
sion support, leading to a strategic advantage by supplying users with constantly updated
information on possible sources of attack.
In the context of Portugal Telecom, Cyber Intelligence breaks down into different
branches. The most important ramifications for this project are risky sources, which
refers to the ”Universe of Events” consisting in all the events that happened on Internet
in general, and compromised targets, which refers to events that happened within an
organisation.
Figure 1.3: Cyber Intelligence Branches
The main goal of this project is the implementation of a scalable architecture for the
collection, analysis, deduplication, classification, tagging and filtering of Cyber Intelli-
gence events, being applied in the context of organisations, business units, infrastructures,
assets or actors.
1.1 Motivation
Nowadays, the concern with Cyber Security in large companies is a reality, not only
because there are legal obligations, required controls, criminal responsibilisation and in
some cases fine payments, but also for the impact that an attack, intrusion and ilicit access
with success, can bring upon the image and business of a company.
In order to mitigate these problems, organisations need mechanisms that collect and
correlate information, regarding a possible attack of the infrastructures, credentials leak,
vulnerable systems, sensitive documentation and others, thereby allowing a reduction of
the time detection, investigation and mitigation of the incidents assigned by the security
analysts.
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At Portugal Telecom there is a great concern with Cyber Security, and regarding the
problems mentioned previously, PT has a department dedicated to security and privacy of
information, the Direc¸a˜o de Cyber Security and Privacy (DCY).
This department is divided in different sections and operations providing to Portugal
Telecom a resilient cyber defense. However, to better mitigate any compromise in the in-
frastructures, it is fundamental to understand the attacks which an organisation is exposed
to, which means analyse past events that occurred whithin and outside the organisation.
Therefore, the main motivation for this project was the availability of a system solution
to facilitate the realisation of the analysis of past events, allowing any organisation to build
better defending mechanisms to avoid and / or mitigate possible attacks.
1.2 Goals
The main goal of this project is the implementation of a scalable architecture for the col-
lection, analysis, deduplication, classification, tagging and filtering of Cyber Intelligence
Events, being applied in the context of organisations, business units, infrastructures, assets
or actors, within the scope of Portugal Telecom. Thereafter, it will be made an analysis
of the filtered Cyber Intelligence Events, in order to better understand the type of attacks
that the organisation is exposed to, and to verify if the developed solution can filter the
events correctly, according to a set of characteristics of each organisation.
To achieve the goal described in the previous paragraph, firstly it will be necessary to
”map” and ”scout” a group of target-entities, in order to have their most relevant attributes,
such as IP addresses, URLs and FQDNs. The second part of this project will be focused on
the configuration of a Cyber Intelligence Tool for the collection, processing and filtering
of security feeds, which are streams of information consisting of facts and evidences that
a certain event occurred. Finally, the filtered data will be analysed, to better understand
the type of events that occurred regarding each target-entity.
1.3 Contributions
This section describes all the steps taken to achieve the main goal of this project.
As mentioned previously, the main goal of this project is to collect, filter, analyse and
treat Cyber Intelligence events regarding certain target-entities.
The first step to achieve the main goal was to define which entities would be used for
this project. These entities are companies that belong to Altice Group (Portugal Telecom
owner) or are PT’s clients. It was chosen four entities: Entity-A, Entity-B, Entity-C and
Entity-D.
The second step was to ”map” and ”scout” each target-entity, in order to discover
all their public information on the Internet, such as, IP addresses, Fully Qualified Do-
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main Names, Domains, URLs and others. With this step was possible to obtain metadata
representing uniquely each entity. Then, the collected metadata served as input for the In-
telMQ Configuration Manager (ICM), which is the program responsible for the automatic
configuration of the Cyber Intelligence Tool IntelMQ, this tool collects and filters Cyber
Intelligence events.
The IntelMQ Configuration Manager generates all the necessary files to configure
IntelMQ, to filter the events that belong to the target-entities. All the configuration files
generated by the program were made taking into account the metadata that compose each
target-entity.
After the generation of the configuration files, IntelMQ is set to filter all the Cyber
Intelligence events that are related to the target-entities. The filtered events are then sent
to an analysis platform, where they are stored. The events are also saved into separate
files, one per target-entity. In the analysis platform, it is possible to forensically examine
the filtered events and correlate them.
1.4 Structure of the Document
This document is organised in the following way:
• Chapter 2 – Context and Related Work. The purpose of this chapter is to give a
context to this project, by introducing key terms, methods of collection and analysis
of Cyber Intelligence and its context inside Portugal Telecom.
• Chapter 3 – Cyber Intelligence Tools Analysis. This chapter describes and analyses
the tools that were used for this project.
• Chapter 4 – IntelMQ Configuration Manager Solution Design. This fourth chapter
presents the solution for the filtering of Cyber Intelligence events that are related to
the target-entities. It is explained the requirements for the IntelMQ Configuration
Manager and how the configurations for IntelMQ are produced.
• Chapter 5 – Implementation. In this chapter it is described in detail the development
of the IntelMQ Configuration Manager, which is a Ruby Script composed of several
methods, where each of them is responsible of the generation of configuration sets
for IntelMQ.
• Chapter 6 – Results and Evalution. The sixth chapter presents the results obtained
by the filtering of the Cyber Intelligence events, it is explained how the filtering was
done (conditions and machine specifications) and the final result of the filtering for
each target-entity.
• Chapter 7 – Conclusion and Future. Finally, this chapter describes all the conclu-
sions, as well as future work to improve the current project.
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Chapter 2
Context and Related Work
This chapter explains the context and related work of this project. It also introduces key
terms and aspects for the project. It is described what is Cyber Intelligence, how it is
collected and treated and what type of data it produces. It is also explained how Cyber
Intelligence is applied in the context of Portugal Telecom and the different tools that
exist to collect and treat Cyber Intelligence and from where this information is collected.
Therefore, this chapter is divided in the following way.
Section 2.1. explains what is Cyber Intelligence and from where this term originated.
Section 2.2. describes how Cyber Intelligence is collected and what types of output it
generates. Section 2.3. explains what is Counter Intelligence. Section 2.4. describes what
is Threat Intelligence. Section 2.5. explains how Cyber Intelligence is treated and pro-
cessed and its lifecycle. Section 2.6. explains what are Cyber Intelligence Feeds, giving
some examples. Section 2.7. describes some Cyber Intelligence Tools and explains their
purpose. Section 2.8. explains the meaning of Cyber Intelligence at Portugal Telecom.
2.1 Cyber Intelligence
There is no definitive definition for Cyber Intelligence. However, there are concepts,
theories and ideas for describing it. To understand Cyber Intelligence it is necessary to
realise that intelligence tactics, techniques and procedures, as well as several types of
operations existed long before cyber space was conceived [3].
In a military context commanders want to know the intent of the adversary, for two
major reasons: (1) to make better strategic choices on the battlefield; (2) to prepare cor-
rectly for an attack. The definitions used by several government and military organisations
may serve as the best foundation for understanding Cyber Intelligence [24].
According to the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) the definition of intelligence is:
1. The product resulting from the collection, processing, integration, evaluation, anal-
ysis, and interpretation of available information concerning foreign nations, hostile
or potentially hostile forces or elements, or areas of actual or potential operations
7
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2. The activities that result in the product
3. The organisations engaged in such activities [5]
From the above definition it is possible to understand that DoD views intelligence as
a product, the activities that lead to this product, and the organisations performing the
activities. However, in general, most uses of intelligence will not include goals defined
by foreign nations. The most simple definition can be presented as: Intelligence is both a
product and process from collecting, processing, analysing and using information to meet
an identified goal [24].
This definition can be applied to Cyber Intelligence, however, is very important to
make sure that the data meets some goal or purpose [24].
There are several types / disciplines within Cyber Intelligence, these may vary accord-
ing from where (source / origin) and how (method) the information was collected.
Cyber Intelligence can be collected from Open Source Intelligence (OSINT), Social
Media Intelligence (SOCMINT), Human Intelligence (HUMINT) or intelligence from
the deep and dark web. The collection method is an advanced process that enables the
organisation to gather valuable insights, based on the analysis of contextual and situational
risks and can be directioned to the organisations specific threat landscape, its industry and
markets [24].
The following sections introduce and explain the different types of Cyber Intelligence,
as well as the different methods of data collection.
2.2 Collection Operations
This section describes different types of collection operations of Cyber Intelligence, as
well as, the types of data that are obtained.
There are many ways to collect data. According to the purpose of an organisation, the
collection of Cyber Intelligence must be adapted to meet certain goals. However, the most
important aspect of Cyber Intelligence Collection Operations is correctly identifying the
right sources of data and making sure the data is valid.
2.2.1 Types of Collection
There are three main categories of collection operations:
• Passive - data collected on information systems or networks. This could be, for
example, monitoring internal activities within an organisation, such as capturing
internal network traffic or collecting system logs.
• Hybrid - data shared from other networks or information systems or collected from
networks designed to attract adversaries. This could be, for example, two identical
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entities sharing information between them about a potential attacker, helping each
other to be prepared in case of an attack. Another example are honeypots produced
to entice adversaries into interacting with them.
• Active - data obtained from external networks or information systems under the
influence of an adversary. It must be taken into account, that sometimes networks
or information systems under the influence of adversaries, might not actually be
owned or controlled by them. For example, a Command and Control server being
used to connect to malware. The server may belong to a victim while it is being
used by the adversary [22].
2.2.2 Types of Data
After understanding the different types of data collection, it is very important to determine
the type of data collected. There are three types of data:
• Raw Data - unvaluated data collected from a source that includes raw details such
as IP addresses, network logs, or forum posts from a potential attacker.
• Exploited Data - data processed and analysed by another analyst which contains
selected raw data. In other words, this type of data should include analysis on what
the data means or indicates, for example, malware or computer campaign reports
with technical information and analysis on a threat.
• Production Data - data finalized into a report for dissemination purposes that in-
cludes limited or no raw data. This type of data is intended for awareness of a
reader / customer or for suggested actions. An example would be advices given to
users or Intrusion Detection System (IDS) signatures ready-made for deployment
[22].
2.3 Counter Intelligence
The main goal of Cyber Counter Intelligence (CCI) is to prevent, deter, defeat, or ma-
nipulate the adversary from conducting intelligence operations on a certain individual, or
those who the individual protects, or the individual’s organisation including its operations
[21].
There are two types of CCI: Defensive and Offensive.
Defensive Cyber Counter Intelligence is seen as actions taken to identify and counter
adversary intrusions before they occur and also as the efforts in identifying and minimis-
ing the threat scenery. In other words, strengthen defenses and prevent intrusion [21].
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The focus of Defensive CCI is to understand the adversary and reduce the threat
scenery to which they might exploit. This type of approach produces reports and analyses
that gives to defenders a complement to their network and information security [21].
Offensive Cyber Counter Intelligence is seen as interactions with the adversary to
directly collect information about their intelligence collection operations or to mislead
them. For example, in Offensive CCI fake personas can be used on online forums, to
gather information about adversary intelligence collection operations, or to flip the adver-
sary operators into double agents to infiltrate the adversary’s operation or publish false
reports and information to mislead opponent intrusion attempts [21].
These actions can be performed inside and outside the organisation’s networks. An
example of an Offensive CCI operation would be identify or alienate adversaries already
in the organisation’s network, by creating a honeypot. This honeypot could have files that
the adversary might be interested in, but which contain fake or incorrect data, allowing to
identify malicious actors on the network, if they try to access the honeypot [21].
2.4 Threat Intelligence
The term threat is often misused, particularly when a threat to one organisation may not
be a threat to another. This happens because most of the organisations fail to identify
threats, spending time and resources on less important areas, such as risk and vulnerability
analysis, instead of mitigating and fixing problems [23].
A threat is a combination of three factors:
• Intent is a malicious actor’s desire to target an organisation.
• Capability is their means to do so.
• Opportunity is the vulnerability the actor needs for performing an attack.
This combination can be summed up as ”if an actor has the intent and capability but
the organisation is not vulnerable or there is no opportunity present, then the actor is not
a threat” [23].
Hereupon, Threat Intelligence is defined as ”evidence-based knowledge, including
context, mechanisms, indicators, implications and actionable advice, about an existing or
emerging menace or hazard to assets that can be used to inform decisions regarding the
subject’s response to that menace or hazard” [14].
The key in Threat Intelligence is to identify what really is a threat for an organisation.
If the organisation that is receiving threat intelligence does not know how to identify what
information is applicable to them, then the whole operation will be useless [23].
An easier way to narrow the identification process to what really matters for the or-
ganisation is dividing threat intelligence in three categories:
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• Timely Intelligence - latest global insights on attacks, attackers and targets;
• Relative Intelligence - goals, motivations and methodologies of adversaries, what
they are after, why they are attacking and how they infiltrated organisations;
• Actionable Intelligence - helps focusing on better prioritising alerts and incidents,
that pose a higher risk for the organisation [12].
If these categories are taken into account while developing a strategic Cyber Threat
Intelligence program, it will allow security teams to quickly assess risk, prioritise alerts
and threats that matter the most, minimise exposure to attack, and ultimately save time
and money by increasing the efficiency of the security operations [12].
2.5 Treatment and Processing
Intelligence has a lifecycle, this lifecycle is a process in Cyber Intelligence that is very
important to convert data into intelligence useful for the organisations. First of all, to
determine what the organisation’s requirements are, it should be chosen a plan and a
direction, meaning, they must have a defined goal and intentions. It can be something
very simple, such as, wanting to know the command and control servers of a piece of
malware, to block it in the network, and to learn the type of information systems that the
organisation’s target uses, making possible to infiltrate them.
The second step, is to define where and how to acquire the data and information to
be processed. This can be, honeypots, dark and deep web, firewalls, or others. Then,
it is necessary to process and convert the collected information, into something possible
to use, such as, being able to access and parse through the data that was collected, or
converting it, to human readable information.
Afterwards, the collected data should be transformed into an intelligence product.
This is achieved through analysis and interpretation, and thus is heavily dependent on
the analyst. The report results should meet a defined intelligence need or goal from the
planning and direction phase.
And finally, the finished intelligence product should be supplied to whom it may con-
cern, but if a user cannot access the product or cannot use it, it means that the final result
did not meet the organisation’s goal. By following these steps, it is possible to gather a
great start into understading Cyber Intelligence and using it as an advantage in case of an
attack [24].
2.6 Cyber Intelligence Feeds
The word feed just by itself, means to nourish something and this meaning can be applied
on the World Wide Web. A web feed, also known as data feed or news feed is a data
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format that provides to users constantly updated content. There are content distributors
which make this information available for users to subscribe it [27].
In the Cyber Security World there are also information feeds, normally called Cyber
Threat Intelligence Feeds. These feeds provide actionable information on adversaries,
being possible to build a stronger Cyber Defense. With the evolution of the cyber space,
it has been necessary to invest and create many sources of information on threat actors
[44].
Nowadays, there are several sources of information in the Cyber Intelligence commu-
nity. These sources rely on anti-malware, firewalls, and other “plug and play” platforms
but they do not encompass the entirety of network security today. Quality threat intelli-
gence feeds deliver the aggregation of multiple sources which only present a true portrayal
of threats and vulnerabilities when examined all together [28].
Some examples of Cyber Threat Intelligence Feeds are the following:
• AlienVault: Provides multiple sources, including large honeynets that profile adver-
saries;
• BitSight Cyberfeed Stream: Provides information on compromised IP addresses,
malware server names, destination IP addresses, ports, host names and others;
• MalwareDomains: Provides a list of malware domains;
• PhishTank: Provides phishing data;
• Shadowserver: Provides different types of data which is filtered appropriately for
responsible areas.
The Cyber Threat Intelligence Feeds collect different types of data, which can be
filtered according to different attributes, known as Indicators of Compromise (IOC). Indi-
cators of Compromise are artifacts observed on a network or in an operating system that
with high confidence indicate a computer intrusion.
There are Feeds that are specific for certain IOCs, for example, they only list IP ad-
dresses that were involved in malicious activities, or they can have information in many
other IOCs, such as:
• FQDN (Fully Qualified Domain Names) which is the complete domain name for a
specific computer, or host, on the Internet;
• Port, the port used on a malicious activity;
• URL (Uniform Resource Locator), which is the source or destination web address
of a malicious activity;
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• CIDR (Classless Inter-Domain Routing), which provides a network address that
may be the source or destination of a malicious activity;
• Protocol application, which is the protocol used on a malicious activity;
In addition to the IOCs, there are also security Feeds, which provide information
on:
• Country, which is the Country name from where originated the malicious activity
or the destination for the attack;
• City, which is the City name from where originated the malicious activity or the
destination for the attack;
• ASN (Autonomous System Number), which is a unique number that is available to
identify an autonomous system and which enables that system to exchange exterior
routing information with other neighboring autonomous systems. This can be the
source or destination ASN of the malicious activity;
• AS Name, the name associated with an Autonomous System, which can be the
source or destination AS name of the malicious acitivity;
• Contact, which usually is the e-mail address of the attacker and / or the victim;
• Malware name, which is the name of the malware used on the malicious activity.
2.7 Cyber Intelligence Tools
There are available several tools (open-source and paid) to help security analysts to col-
lect and treat Cyber Threat Intelligence. These tools support an analyst to search and
understand different types of data. They allow any organisation to build resilient defense
mechanisms and to be prepared for an attack even before the attack occurs. The best tactic
for a resilient cyber defense is to combine different tools and collection mechanisms.
Some examples of Cyber Intelligence Tools are the following:
• Research tools: An example of a research tool is the website virustotal.com. An-
alysts turn to this type of resources for quick reference regarding many types of
Indicators of Compromise. Virustotal is also a community where analysts report
suspicious / malicious indicators, isuch that this service has historical data and cur-
rent data, as well [4].
• SIEM (Security Information and Event Management): A SIEM is a powerful tool
which allows analysts to monitor their organisation’s network traffic in real time,
allowing Incident Response teams to react to incoming threats [4].
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• Threat Intelligence Provider: Organisations sometimes hire outside services / com-
panies for their Threat Intelligence collection requirements, monitoring for ongoing
and developing threats that matter to them. These include social media monitoring,
hacktivism campaigns and CVE (Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures) aware-
ness, regarding the concerns of an organisation, their business and brand. However,
there are some organisations which prefer to have internal teams focus on this task.
An example of a tool for this purpose is Recorded Future. This tool allows an-
alysts to access the collected information, while also offering a suite of powerful
search functionalities that provide an internal Intel team the ability to customize
and automate searches[4].
• Network Traffic Analysis Framework: An example of a network traffic analysis
framework is Bro, which is used by a wide variety of security professionals. Bro
is a network monitoring framework that can be used for detecting network intru-
sion, collecting network measurements, and generating an extensive set of log files
that records a network’s activity in high level terms. These logs include not only
a comprehensive record of every connection seen on the network, but also applica-
tion layer transcripts such as all HTTP sessions and their requested URIs (Uniform
Resource Identifier), key headers, MIME (Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions)
types, and server responses [4].
• Disassembler: Malware is an increasing concern among organisations and it is con-
stantly being refined and improved. Reverse engineering malware is a process that
Incident Response teams can use to identify how malicious a threat is, as well as
give the team insight into how to defend against similar attacks in the future. IDA
Pro is a great disassembler that explores binary programs and creates maps of a
malicious file’s execution [4].
• Web Proxy: There are tools that analyse inbound traffic in a safe environment, in
order to prevent infection when a user accidentally or inadvertently visits a website
that may be hosting malicious content. An example of tool for this purpose is Burp.
It provides to an analyst a safe line of control for the inspection of traffic interacting
with a network, making it tougher for threats to make their way in [4].
• Cybersecurity Platform: A security platform helps organisations to identify, man-
age, and block threats faster. It gives the possibility for a Response Team to inte-
grate multiple tools in just one platform. An example of a Cybersecurity Platform
is ThreatConnect. It allows users to customise and import threat data feeds to their
instance, as well as the ability to join other like organisations in Communities that
share similar threat data [4].
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2.8 Cyber Intelligence at Portugal Telecom
As mentioned previously in this chapter, there is no definitive definition for Cyber Intel-
ligence and each company has their own concept of Cyber Intelligence according to the
company’s goals and intervation areas. Cyber Intelligence must be used wisely, in order
to prevent / mitigate any attacks which an organisation might be exposed to. At Portugal
Telecom Cyber Intelligence is a combination of different areas / subjects, as shown in
figure 2.1.
A detailed explanation of the different areas of Cyber Intelligence at Portugal Telecom
is given, as follows:
• Reputation and Revenue Loss: every company has a brand to defend and to main-
tain, in order to provide a reliable service and confidence to its costumers. However,
an organisation might be a victim of brandjacking, which is someone falsely im-
plying some kind of association with the brand. An example of brandjacking are
phishing activities, where the perpetrator actively promotes themselves as a legiti-
mate brand representative. This type of attack has two main negative effects, firstly,
if the brand abuse was an attempt to capture sales for a competing product or ser-
vice, it will lead to revenue loss. Secondly, if the brand abuse was carried out with
the goal of damaging the brand’s image, then this results as reputation loss [40].
• Legal and Compliance: an organisation must be aware and understand its legal
obligations, regarding cyber security. It is very important to protect personal data
from unauthorised access, damage, loss or disclosure. The company must ensure
a level of protection that is appropriate, taking into account the harm that may be
caused to individuals in the event of a data security breach and the nature of the data.
According to the Act on the Protection of Personal Data [31], it is not required that
organisations prevent cyber security breaches from occurring, but to take all the
appropriate measures to protect the data. Otherwise, there will be a legal breach, if
it is proven that the organisation did not take the appropriate measures to secure the
data [6].
• Security Threats: hackers (someone who, with their technical knowledge, uses bugs
or exploits to break into computer systems) are relentlessly inventive and are con-
stantly evolving, in order to find new ways to steal and harm. These might include
hacktivism, which is the insurgent use of computers and computer networks to pro-
mote a political agenda or a social change. In other words, it is the act of hacking,
or breaking into a computer system, for a politically or socially motivated purpose.
These type of threat can, as mentioned previously, damage the brand of an organisa-
tion. For example, an individual might leave a highly visible message on the home
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page of a company that gets a lot of traffic or which incorporates a point-of-view
that is being opposed [48] [38].
• Security Diligence: for every company, cyber security weaknesses represent a high
risk for their operations, reputation and business. Security diligence allows to verify
the overall health and hygiene of the organisation. There should be a team respon-
sible for finding problems in the security of the company, making sure that there
are not any information leakage, unmanaged file sharing, or exposed credentitials.
If it is given the correct diligence to the network of the organisation, the data and
the network itself it will be more secure [42] [20].
• Active Vulnerability Discovery: in general, the active vulnerability discovery al-
lows to identify weaknesses throughout the network of an organisation, such as
ports that could be accessed by unauthorised users, or software missing the latest
security patches, helping to ensure network compliance with the company’s secu-
rity policy [30].
– Manual Penetration Testing: this type of test is done by an expert engineer,
and its focused on finding vulnerabilities or any type of risk in a machine /
network [45].
– Automatic: this test is much faster, efficient, easy, and reliable. It also tests the
vulnerability and risk of a machine / network, but its automatic, meaning that
this technology does not require any expert engineer. There are many tools
that can be used for this purpose, such as Nessus or OpenVAs [45].
• Passive Vulnerability Discovery: this type of vulnerability discovery identifies the
active operating systems, applications and ports throughout a network, monitoring
activity to determine the network’s vulnerabilities. However, while passive vulner-
ability discovery provides information about weaknesses, it can not take action to
resolve security problems. It is checked the current software and patch versions on
networked devices, indicating which device is using software that presents a po-
tential entrance for attacks, and reference this information against public databases
containing lists of current patches [30].
• Compromised Targets: every organisation should have mechanisms to identify at-
tacks, to understand if their network is infected, or if there are any machines mak-
ing unsolicited communications. For example, there is a Cyber Intelligence Feed,
named ShadowServer which provides reports of malicious activities on the network
of an organisation. With these reports is possible to analyse the type of attacks that
happened within the organisation, and identify which machines / devices that were
infected [39].
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• Risky Sources: as mentioned in section 2.6, there are several Cyber Intelligence
Feeds, which provide actionable information on adversaries. Mainly, they provide
lists of Cyber Intelligence events, which are composed by IP addresses, or domain
names used as command and control communication channels. These events oc-
curred on the Internet and the Cyber Intelligence Feeds share them, this way many
organisations are informed of what has happened outside of the company and can
be prepared in case of an attack [17].
Figure 2.1: Cyber Intelligence at Portugal Telecom
Summarising, Portugal Telecom divides Cyber Intelligence into different sections,
where they complement each other. This way is possible to understand what is happening
within and outside of the organisation, being possible to build a better protection in the
long run and avoid / prevent any form of attack to the company’s infrastructures, data and
assets.
2.9 Conclusion
This chapter introduced the concept of Cyber Intelligence, its origin, the different types
that exist, how and from it is collected and how it is treated. Each type of Cyber Intel-
ligence collection produces different data, and according to the type of data it should be
treated in a specific way, in order to make the most of the collected information. Cyber
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Intelligence can be collected from different sources on the Internet, and it is possible to
filter information, according to what it is most relevant to the organisation. There are
available different Cyber Intelligence Tools to collect data from the sources of informa-
tion on the Internet, helping security analysts in the analysis and treatment of the obtained
Intelligence. At Portugal Telecom, Cyber Intelligence is divided into different branches,
and the combination of these different fields is what allows to the organision to prevent
and / or mitigate any form of attack.
The following chapter introduces and analyses the Cyber Intelligence Tools that were
used for this project.
Chapter 3
Cyber Intelligence Tools Analysis
As mentioned in the previous chapter, there are innumerable Cyber Intelligence tools
which help security analysts to collect and treat Cyber Intelligence events. As the main
goal of this project is the collection, analysis, deduplication, classification, tagging and
filtering of Cyber Intelligence events, it was necessary to use Cyber Intelligence Tools to
achieve the goal of the project.
This project will be based mainly in two distinct tools, one for data collection and
analysis and another to filter Cyber Intelligence events. Therefore, the purpose of this
chapter is to describe both tools, their purpose, how they function, and the type of outputs
that they return.
The Cyber Intelligence events that were collected and analysed are events that already
occurred, thus belonging to the past. It is very important to understand what happened in
the past, in order to build a more resilient solution and avoid future attacks.
“To know your future you must know your past”. [George Santayana]
3.1 Data Collection and Processing
To accomplish the goal of this project, it was necessary to collect and filter Cyber In-
telligence events. An event, in the context of PT Cyber Watch, is an observable fact or
occurrence on the public Internet (involving IP addresses, FQDNs and URLs), where it
occurred within a certain period of time.
The first step to reach the main goal was to collect public information from the Internet
about the target-entities. To gather the information, the Maltego tool was used. This tool
will be described on section 3.2.
This tool has the capability to query several sources on the Internet and find links
and relationships between several pieces of information. With Maltego it was possible to
find the most relevant attributes of each target-entity, such as public IP addresses, DNSs,
19
Chapter 3. Cyber Intelligence Tools Analysis 20
FQDNs and URLs, being possible to characterise each entity uniquely.
The collected metadata about each target-entity was then used to configure the tool
IntelMQ responsible for the collection, deduplication, classification, tagging and filtering
of Cyber Intelligence events. A detailed analysis of this tool will be provided in section
3.3.
IntelMQ collects Cyber Intelligence events from different feeds, open-source and
paid, external and internal. The purpose of this tool, in the context of this project, is
to filter events according to a set of characteristics of the target-entities. For example, if
an event contains an IP address that belongs to one of the target-entities, then that event
is going to be filtered and directed to the corresponding entity.
Afterwards, all the filtered events will be sent to a platform named HIDRA (High
performance Infrastructure for Data Research and Analysis) which is an agile platform
for long-term event processing and traffic pattern analysis. This platform was developed
at Portugal Telecom by DCY / CSD (CyberSecurity Development and Integration) and
is based on Elasticsearch (responsible for storing all the logs of a system), RabbitMQ
(message broker), Kibana (a web interface that can be used for searching and viewing
logs) and Ruby programs. The main goal of this platform is to enable the rapid and agile
development and implementation of complex event processing systems. This platform is
going to store the filtered events and will allow to perform a forensic analysis to them
[47].
3.2 Maltego
Maltego is an interactive data mining tool that renders directed graphs for link analysis.
The tool is used in online investigations for finding relationships between pieces of in-
formation from various sources located on the Internet. Its main focus is on providing
a library of transforms (scripts which search for specific information on several sources
on the Internet) for discovery of data from open sources, and visualising information in a
graph format, suitable for link analysis and data mining [33].
The focus of Maltego is analysing real-world relationships between information that
is publically accessible on the Internet. This may include footprinting the Internet in-
frastructure, as well as finding information about the people and organisation who own it
[33].
Maltego can be used to determine the relationships between several entities, such as:
• People (Names, E-mail Addresses, Aliases);
• Groups of People (Social Networks);
• Companies;
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• Organisations;
• Websites;
• Internet Infrastructures (Domains, DNS Names, Netblocks, IP Addresses);
• Affiliations;
• Documents and Files.
Connections between these pieces of information are found using open-source in-
telligence techniques by querying sources such as DNS records, whois records, search
engines, social networks, various online APIs and extracting meta data.
Maltego provides results in a wide range of graphical layouts that allow for clustering
of information, allowing relationships to be quickly and accurately, making it possible to
see hidden connections, and even allowing to know if they are three or four degrees of
separation apart [33].
Maltego provides to its users two types of products: Maltego Clients and Maltego
Servers.
There are four types of Maltego Clients, each tailored for different purposes.
• Maltego XL: allows to visualise large data sets and is suited for people who need to
show relationships between up to 1 million pieces of information.
• Maltego Classic: allows users to visualise up to 10 000 pieces of information and
the relationships between them.
• Maltego CE (Community Edition): this client is the community edition of Maltego,
offering the same functionality as Maltego Classic with some limitations.
• CaseFile: solves the offline intelligence problem. This client combines Maltego’s
graph and link analysis functionality. This tool allows analysts to examine links
between offline data.
The main difference between Maltego Classic, Maltego XL and Maltego CE are the
number of entities that can be returned from a single transform and the maximum number
of entities that can be on a single graph.
CaseFile on the other hand is mostly used by analysts using offline data who do not
need access to the standard transforms within Maltego [33].
Regarding the Maltego’s Servers, there are three types:
• CTAS (Commercial Transform Application Server): this server includes all the
transforms found on Paterva’s (Maltego’s Company owner) public server.
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• iTDS (internal Transform Distribution Server): this server has a web-based front-
end that makes it easy to manage, share and distribute custom-built transforms from
a common point.
• Comms Server (Communication Server): A comms server gives the user the ability
to share graphs and have multiple people work on a single graph at the same time
[33].
Maltego servers can be deployed within an organisation, which means that instead of
having the organisation’s transforms running over Paterva’s infrastructure, the organisa-
tion can host their transform servers on an infrastructure that they control. An internal
server gives to an organisation the ability to integrate with their structured internal data
and leverage internal processes, as well as the ability to distribute these transforms across
their enterprise [33].
Figures 3.1 and 3.2 show examples of Maltego Graphs:
Figure 3.1: Maltego Graph Example 1 [13]
Figure 3.1 shows the relationship between two people and their social networks.
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Figure 3.2: Maltego Graph Example 2
Figure 3.2 shows the relationship between a domain, DNS names, an IP address and
a location.
3.3 IntelMQ
IntelMQ is a solution for IT (Information Technology) security teams, such as CERT
(Computer Emergency Response Team) or CSIRT (Computer Security Incident Response
Team), for collecting and processing security feeds using a message queuing protocol.
These feeds are streams of information consisting of facts and evidences that a certain
event has occurred. Its main goal is to give to incident responders an easy way to collect
and process Cyber Intelligence events. IntelMQ can be integrated with other existing
tools[9].
This tool has a modular structure based on bots (software applications that perform
automated and repetitive tasks). There are four types of bots:
• Collector-Bots: these bots are responsible for the data collection from internal and
external sources, the output that these bots return are reports consisting of many
individual data sets;
• Parser-Bots: these bots parse the collected data by splitting it into individual events
and giving them a defined structure;
• Expert-Bots: these bots enrich the existing events by adding extra fields of infor-
mation, such as reverse records, geographic location information or abuse contacts;
• Output-Bots: these bots write events to files, databases, among others.
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Each bot has one source-queue (apart from the collector-bots) and can have multiple
destination queues (except for the output-bots). However, multiple bots can write to the
same pipeline, resulting in multiple inputs for the next bot. Every bot runs in a separate
process and they are uniquely identifiable by a bot-id. [9]
IntelMQ uses a concept named botnet. The botnet represents all currently config-
ured bots, which are explicitly enabled. To add bots to the botnet or to configure them,
IntelMQ uses four configuration files: runtime.conf, which contains all the bots configu-
rations, pipeline.conf, which contains all the source and destination queues of every bot of
the botnet, harmonization.conf, which specifies the fields for all message types, ensuring
that the values are compliant with the ”harmonization” format, and defaults.conf where
is specified the default values for all bots and their behaviour. The bots communicate
between them, through the messaging queues specified in the file pipeline.conf.
Figure 3.3: IntelMQ Botnet Example
Figure 3.3 represents an IntelMQ botnet. The red bots are the collectors, the green
bot represents the parser-bot, the blue bots are the expert-bots and the yellow bots are the
output-bots.
Figure 3.4 shows a template of the runtime.conf file and an example of a bot config-
uration in the same file. The first line of the configuration is always the bot name, which
must be unique, the second line is where it is defined which group the bot belongs, it
might be a collector, a parser, an expert or an output. The next line is the Python module
to execute the bot, this field is followed by the description of the bot to specify its func-
tion in the botnet. Finally, it is defined the bot’s parameters, these may vary according
to the bot type. The parameters might be the feed URL from where the bot is collecting
information, the feed name, the time interval that the bot must collect the information and
many others.
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Figure 3.4: Runtime Configuration File Example
Figure 3.5 presents a template and a an example of a configuration of the file pipeline.conf.
The purpose of this file is to configure the source and destinations queues of each bot, in
other words, it configures the ”path” from where the messages (events) must pass in the
pipeline until they reach the output of the botnet. Similar to the file runtime.conf, the first
line of the configurations is always the bot-id, which is the unique identifier of a bot. The
second line of the configuration is the the source-queue, which is the queue of the bot
itself, while the destination queues are the bots queues to where the events must be sent.
There are some rules related to the queues, according to the bot type. For example, the
collector-bots can have several destination-queues, while output-bots can not have any,
because they are the end of the pipeline.
In the example of the figure 3.5 the bot-id is malware-domain-list-parser, the source
queue is the queue of the bot itself and the destination-queue is the bot file-output. As
these configurations refer to the bot queues, it is added the word ”queue” to the bot-id.
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Figure 3.5: Pipeline Configuration File Example
The files runtime.conf and pipelime.conf are in JSON format (JavaScript Object No-
tation), which is lightweight data-interchange format. It is easy for humans to read and
write and it is easy for machines to parse and generate [18].
On IntelMQ, all messages (reports and events) are Python / JSON dictionaries. The
key names and according types are defined by IntelMQ Harmonization Rules. These
rules are meant to keep simplicity and consistency between the data and the data fields
that compose an IntelMQ event.
A field is a key=value pair and for a clear and unique definition of a field, the key
(field-name) must be defined, as well as the possible values. A field belongs to an event,
which is a structured log record in the form key=value , key=value , key=value . The
fields definition is made on the harmonization.conf file. This file follows the same rules
as the runtime.conf and pipeline.conf files. Figure 3.6 shows an example of the harmo-
nization.conf file.
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Figure 3.6: Harmonization Configuration File Example
To validate IntelMQ events these must fulfill certain requirements. The minimum
requirements for an IntelMQ event to make sense are [17]:
• Feed name, from where IntelMQ collected the event;
• Type of event that was found, for example, spam or malware;
• Taxonomy of the event, for example, Abusive Content (it can be associated to spam)
or Malicious Code (it can be associated to malware);
• Time source, the time reported by a source (feed);
• Observation time, the time a source bot saw the event.
Additionally, an IntelMQ event must contain at least one of the following fields:
• Source IP, IP address that initiated the connection;
• Source FQDN, DNS name related to a host that originated the connection;
• Source URL, refers to a malicious resource whose interpretation is defined by the
abuse type. A URL with phishing as an abuse type refers to a phishing resource;
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• Source Account, name of an account or e-mail address related to the origin of an
event.
There are several types of feeds where the collector-bots can retrieve information,
these feeds can be open-source or paid, external and internal, and they contain several
types of data, such as, IP addresses that were involved in malicious activities [9]. For each
feed the collector-bot must be configured accordingly and it must be used the parser-bot
which corresponds to the input feed.
Table 3.1 shows all the feeds that are on IntelMQ.
Table 3.1: IntelMQ Feeds List
Feed Name Description
Abuse.ch
It provides information on malicious domains,
IP addresses, ransomware family and ZeuS trojan
Alien Vault
URL: It contains an IP reputation database that
determines which public IP addresses
are involved in malicious activity.
OTX pulses: The OTX community reports on and receives
threat data in the form of pulses. An OTX pulse consists
of one or more indicators of compromise (IOCs)
that constitute a threat, a campaign, or
an infrastructure used by a malicious actor.
IOCs act as vectors for active threats to
networks and computers.
Autoshun
It contains a list of IP addresses
related to organised crime or malicious activities.
Bambenek
It contains lists of IP addresses,
domains and DGA (Domain Generated Algorithms)
related to malicious activity of CnC servers
Bitcash
Blocklist provided by bitcash.cz of banned
IPs for service abuse, this includes scanning,
sniffing, harvesting, and DoS attacks.
BitSight Ciberfeed Stream
It provides information on compromised
IP addresses, malware server names,
destination IP addresses, ports, host names and others.
Blocklist.de
It provides information on malicious
IP addresses, Bots, Brute-Force Logins,
FTP, IMAP, IRC Bot, Mail, SIP, SSH and Strong IPs
Blueliv CrimeServer
It is a platform that provides targeted
cyber threat information and analysis
intelligence for large enterprises, service providers,
and security vendors.
Crime Servers Data related to a server
that has been used to perform some kind of malicious activity.
Continued on next page
Chapter 3. Cyber Intelligence Tools Analysis 29
Table 3.1 – Continued from previous page
Feed Name Description
CI Army
It provides threat intelligence harvested
from the CINS (Cargo Incident Notification System)
consisting of IP addresses related to malicious activities
CleanMX
It contains information about
Phishing websites and malwares.
Cymru
It returns a list of fullbogons (private and
reserved addresses and netblocks that
have not been allocated to a regional
internet registry).
They are commonly found as
the source addresses of DdoS attacks.
DShield
It provides information on AS numbers,
subnets and malicious URLs
Danger Rulez
It provides a list of IP addresses that
tried to perform SSH brute-force attacks
DynDNS
It provides a list of ponmocup malware
redirection domains and infected web-servers
Fraunhofer DGA
It provides a list of domain names
that were dynamically created by
malware using Domain Generation Algorithms (DGAs)
HPHosts It provides a list of malicous hosts
Malc0de
It provides a list of domains
and IP addresses involved in malicious activities
Malware Domain List It provides a list of malware domains
Malware Domains It provides a list of malware domains
MalwarePatrol Dans Guardian
It provides information on malware
& ransomware URLs, C&Cs,
IP addresses, malware hashes and DGAs
Netlab 360
It provides information on DGA families
and Magnitude Exploit Kit
Nothink
It provides information on attacks
against DNS honeypots and IP addresses
that tried to connect to honeypots
via SNMP, SSH and Telnet
OpenBL
It provides a list of IP addresses that
tried to perform various types of Internet abuse
OpenPhish
It uses proprietary Artificial Intelligence
algorithms to automatically identify
zero-day phishing sites and provide
comprehensive, actionable, real-time
threat intelligence
PhishTank It provides phishing data
Continued on next page
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Table 3.1 – Continued from previous page
Feed Name Description
ShadowServer
Shadowserver collects different types
of data which is filtered appropriately
for responsible areas (ASN, CIDR,
Country Code or TLD).
Spamhaus
It provides a list of netblocks that are
“hijacked” used for dissemination
of malware, trojan downloaders,
botnet controllers
Taichung
It provides a list of IP addresses
that were involved in malicious activities
Turris Greylist
It provides a list of IP addresses
that have tried to obtain information
about services on Turris routers
URLVir
It provides a list of malicious
hosts and IP addresses hosting malware
VXVault
It provides a list of IP addresses
and Hosts that are involved in malicious activities
3.3.1 Intelmqctl
Intelmqctl is the main tool to handle an IntelMQ installation and it also handles the bots
themselves. It can be used as a command line tool, as a library and as a tool by other
programs. If called directly, it will print all outputs to the console.
With Intelmqctl it is possible to start / stop the bots, verify their status, consult their
log files, restart and reload the whole botnet. This is all done by commands through a
terminal.
For example, to start a bot with the ID file-output , it will be created a file with its
PID (Process Identifier) in the directory /opt/intelmq/var/run/[bot-id].pid and the output
in the terminal for starting the bot is the following:
Figure 3.7: Intelmqctl Start Command [17]
Figure 3.7 shows the intelmqctl command to start the bot file-output and then it prints
to the terminal the status of the bot. If the bot was already running it will not be started
again and its status will be printed to the terminal, as shown in figure 3.8:
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Figure 3.8: Intelmqctl Starting a Bot That Was Already Running [17]
To stop a bot, if the PID does not exist a SIGINT will be sent to the process. A
SIGINT is the interrupt signal. The terminal sends it to the foreground process when the
user presses ctrl-c [29].
After 0.25 seconds (the minimum time to understand if a bot is running) is checked if
the process it is running. If not, the PID file will be removed. Figure 3.9 shows the stop
command.
Figure 3.9: Intelmqctl Stop Command [17]
If the bot was not running, then there is nothing to execute, as shown in figure 3.10:
Figure 3.10: Intelmqctl Stopping a Bot that Was Not Running [17]
To restart the botnet or a single bot the commands stop and start are applied consecu-
tively, as the following figure shows:
Figure 3.11: Intelmqctl Restart Bot [17]
For the reloading of a bot, Intelmqctl sends a SIGHUP to the bot, which will reload
the configuration. SIGHUP (”signal hang up”) is a signal sent to a process when its
controlling terminal is closed [29].
Figure 3.12 shows the reload of the bot file-output .
Figure 3.12: Intelmqctl Reload Bot [17]
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If the bot is not running, then it can not be reloaded, as shown in the following figure:
Figure 3.13: Intelmqctl Reloading of a Stopped Bot [17]
3.3.2 IntelMQ Manager
To manage IntelMQ there is available a graphical tool for it, called IntelMQ Manager, as
shown in figure 3.14. This is a graphical interface to manage configurations for the In-
telMQ framework. An IntelMQ configuration is a set of configuration files, which are run-
time.conf, pipeline.conf, harmonization.conf and defaults.conf, however, for this project
only the files runtime.conf and pipeline.conf will be configured. This interface describes
which bots and processing steps should be run and in which order. IntelMQ Manager is
an intuitive tool that allows non-programmers to specify the data flow in IntelMQ.
The interface allows its users to visually configure the whole IntelMQ pipeline and
the parameters of every single bot. Users will be able to see the pipeline in a graph-like
visualisation similar to the following figure:
Figure 3.14: IntelMQ Manager Interface Pipeline View[17]
When a node (bot) is added or edited, the users are presented with a form with the
available parameters for a bot. Then the parameters can be easily changed as shown in
figure 3.15.
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Figure 3.15: Form for Bots Configuration [17]
After editing the bots configurations and pipeline, it is possible to save them and the
changes are automatically written to the correct files. In other words, the IntelMQ Frame-
work originally comes with default configuration files, runtime.conf and pipeline.conf.
These files already contain some bots configurations and it is possible to edit them and
add more configurations ”by hand”, but with IntelMQ Manager there is no need to edit
the files ”by hand”, because when a pipeline is created through IntelMQ Manager, this
tool will edit these files and save the configurations automatically, being much more user-
friendly.
The saved configurations are then ready to be deployed. The interface has a Manage-
ment section where it is possible to observe the saved configurations. This section allows
to start / stop the entire botnet or single bots and it also shows which of them are running
/ stopped.
The IntelMQ Manager Interface also allows to monitor the logs of individual bots or
see the status of the queues for the entire system or for single bots.
3.4 Conclusion
This chapter described the main tools that were used for this project. It was also described
how the data collection and processing between the two tools was made. Maltego was
used to collect data on the target-entities. This tool used a set of transforms to find all the
public information on the Internet about the entities, creating a graph with connections
between the found data.
The metadata found by Maltego was used as input for IntelMQ, in order to filter the
events that are related to the target-entities. IntelMQ uses several configuration files to
form a botnet capable of collecting, tagging and filtering the events that are more relevant
for this project. The events are collected from various Cyber Intelligence Feeds on the
Internet and are filtered according to the information on the target-entities. IntelMQ can
be managed through Intelmqctl, which uses the command line and is less user-friendly,
but it also has a graphic interface, the IntelMQ Manager, which is more intuitive and more
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user-friendly.
The following chapter will describe in detail how the solution for the filtering of the
events was found.
Chapter 4
IntelMQ Configuration Manager
Solution Design
This chapter explains the design of the solution that was found to filter all events, ac-
cording to the range of IP addresses of the target-entities and their FQDNs and URLs,
therefore this chapter is organised as follows.
The first section describes the requirements for the solution design, the second section
describes the solution as a whole, while the following sections describe in detail all the
steps to reach the goal of this project. The third section describes how the most relevant
attributes of each target-entity were collect and organised. In other words, it explains
how the IP addresses of the target-entities and their FQDNs and URLs were obtained.
The fourth and fifth sections explain how IntelMQ filters the events according to the IP
addresses, FQDNs and URLs of the target-entities.
4.1 Requirements
For this project it was developed a Ruby Script to configure IntelMQ automatically, the
script configures IntelMQ to generate a specific botnet to filter Cyber Intelligence events,
according to the attributes of the target-entities, which were obtained by Maltego.
The script must reach some requirements:
• It must be dynamic, it must not have static information, all the static information
should be in configurations files;
• It must be versatile, if the botnet needs an update, for example, if we want to add a
new bot to it, it should not to be necessary to make changes on the Ruby code;
• It must be efficient, it must not be time consuming nor consume computer re-
sources;
• It must be simple and easy to understand, the script must be well documented, in
order for others understand the code easily.
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4.2 Solution Design
Figure 4.1: IntelMQ Configuration Manager Solution Design
Figure 4.1 gives an overview of the solution design for this project. At the top of the
image there is the metadata obtained by Maltego on the target-entities, which is used to
create YAML files. These files are then used as input to configure IntelMQ, which in
turn, it collects information from different security feeds and performs the deduplication,
classification, tagging and filtering of the Cyber Intelligence events. Lastly, the events are
sent to HIDRA and to the corresponding file of each target-entity. This way the events are
stored, thus allowing a forensic analysis (analysing and presenting facts about the events).
4.3 Maltego Metadata
To accomplish the goal of this project, firstly it was necessary to find the most relevant
attributes of each target-entity, through scoutting and mapping the entities using Maltego.
As mentioned in the previous chapter, Maltego is used for online investigations for
finding relationships between pieces of information from various sources, located on the
Internet. In this particular case, Maltego was used to find public information about the
target entities.
Each target entity has a public domain and it was from these domains that the online
investigation started. In Maltego is possible to create different entities representing, in
this case, the domains of each target entity and is possible to execute several transforms
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on these domains. The transforms query several data sources, in order to obtain the infor-
mation on the target entities. Each time a transform is executed, it is added to the graph
representation, the corresponding information that the transform found, creating the links
between the data.
The transforms executed on the target entities were: DNS From Domain and Resolve
To IP Address. The DNS From Domain transform is a group of transforms, while the
other two are single transforms.
The transforms that compose the DNS From Domain transform are:
• To DNS Name [Using DB]: this transform searches for the given Domain in the
Robtex Database. Robtex contains billions of documents of Internet data, collected
over more than a decade [32];
• To DNS Name - MX(mail server): this transform determines if an MX record exists
for the given Domain. The MX record is the mail exchanger record and is returned
as an MXrecord Entity. The IP address of this record gives a good indication of the
network location of the target as most organisations keep their mail close to their
network [32];
• To DNS Name - NS(name server): this transform determines if an NS record exists
for the given Domain. The NS record is the name server record and is returned as
an NSrecord Entity [32];
• To Domain Name - Zone Transfer: this transform attempts a zone transfer against
all name server available for a domain [32];
• To DNS Name [attempt Zone Transfer]: this transform attempts a zone transfer on
the Domain. If possible it extracts the Cnames and A records from the zone as DNS
Name. If a zone transfer is possible then all the DNS names associated with the
Domain are returned [32];
• To DNS Name [Find Common DNS Names]: this transform attempts to find DNS
names for the specified Domain. This is done by testing a list of DNS Names and
seeing if they exist, this list if configured on the transform [32];
• To DNS Name [Using Name Schema]: this transform will try several word lists,
such as planet names, colours, TLDs and others, as DNS names. If it finds a match
in a specific word list, it will try the entire word list. In this way it will try to
determine the naming schema for the Domain [32];
• To Website [Quick lookup]: this transform will do a quick look up to verify if the
DNS entry www.domain exists. This transform is useful when dealing with a large
amount of domains and check quickly which of them have websites [32];
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• To Website DNS [using Search Engine]: this transform will search for the domain
name and then show the web sites where the domain name occurs [32].
Figure 4.2: Maltego Transform List: DNS From Domain
Figure 4.2 shows the list of transforms that compose the transform DNS From Do-
main on Maltego’s application.
After executing the previous transforms, it was applied to the obtained result set the
transform Resolve to IP Address. This transform resolves the DNS names into an IP
address.
Table 4.1 shows the total of DNS names, Domains, IP addresses, MX records, NS
records and Websites that Maltego found for each target-entity.
Table 4.1: Maltego’s obtained data
Entities DNSNames Domains
IPv4
Addresses
MX
Records
NS
Records Websites
A 80 5 88 1 5 30
B 25 3 18 1 2 8
C 1 1 9 4 4 2
D 257 20 78 1 4 72
After scouting and mapping the target-entities with Maltego and know their most rel-
evant attributes, the metadata was used as input for a Ruby Program (which will be de-
scribed on chapter 5). It was created YAML files with the metadata of each target-entity,
in this case, it was created four YAML files, each one representing one target-entity. The
format of the YAML files is shown on figure 4.3.
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Figure 4.3: YAML File Structure Example
All the entity YAML files are composed by the following elements:
• name: which identifies the target-entity;
• classification id: the identifier used by IntelMQ to filter the events, according to the
respective target-entity;
• output: the configuration of IntelMQ output-bot for the respective target-entity. For
all the target entities it was used a file-output-bot, which means that the events
related to the target-entities will go to a specific file that is specified in the bot
configuration;
• public network names: this section is composed by lists of URLs, FQDNs and
domains which were found by Maltego;
• public network addresses: this section is composed by lists of single IP addresses,
ranges and subnets.
4.4 Case 1: IP Addresses First Pipeline
To fitler all the events according to the range of IP addresses of each target-entity, it was
necessary to build a specific IntelMQ pipeline.
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Figure 4.4: IntelMQ Pipeline to Filtrate IP Addresses
In figure 4.4 is possible to observe the first pipeline created to filter the events. The first
part of the pipeline denominated by ”Pipeline Entrance Point” is composed by different
collector bots and their corresponding parsers. As mentioned previously, the collector bots
are responsible of the gathering of events in several Cyber Intelligence Feeds. Although,
these feeds are the origin of events, the most important part of this project is how the
events are filtered, according to the specifications of the target-entities.
The first expert bot used in this pipeline is the asn-lookup-expert-bot. This bot is
responsible for adding AS numbers to the events . To make this bot work, it was necessary
to build an ASN database. This database is composed by subnets that belong to the target-
entities and for each target-entity it was assigned an unique AS Number, according to the
Autonomous System (AS) Reservation for Private Use [16]. This means that there are
1023 different AS numbers, from the range 64512 to 65534 inclusive. If in the future there
will be more than 1023 target-entities, it will be necessary to review the ASN algorithm.
This bot will add to the events the fields source.asn and destination.asn if the IP addresses
in the event are in the customised ASN database.
The ASN database is built with the single IP addresses, ranges and subnets that are
in the YAML files of each target-entity, then the AS numbers are added to the database,
according to the respective target-entity and their IP addresses. The AS numbers are
attributed to each entity by the Ruby program, which will be explained in more detail in
chapter 5. This database is composed by two columns, the first column contains all the IP
addresses in the CIDR format and the second column contains the correspoding private
AS number. Figure 4.5 shows an example of the ASN database.
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Figure 4.5: ASN Database Example
Next, on the pipeline is the modify-expert-bot. This bot will add to the event the field
event description.text, according to the AS numbers on the customised ASN database,
and the value of this field will be the same as on the field classification id of the YAML
files, which is an unique identifier for the target-entities.
If the AS number on the event is not in the customised ASN database or the event does
not contain an AS Number the field event description.text will have the value “others”, in
order to filter the events that are not related to the target-entities.
The modify-expert-bot works using a configuration file in JSON format, where it is
specified certain fields of an event, and if the values of those fields match with the given
configuration of the modify-expert-bot, then the field on the configuration file is added to
the event. Figure 4.6 shows an example of the configuration file for the modify-expert-bot.
Figure 4.6: Modify Configuration File Example
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For example, if an event contains the field malware.name and its value is the name
”conficker”, then the malware name matches with the rule in the configuration file, so
the modify-expert-bot will add to the event the field classification.identifier with the value
”conficker”, as well. This bot allows to enrich the events with information, by changing
or adding fields and values to the events, without altering the code of many other bots.
In this project, the configuration file of the modify-expert-bot was made with separate
sets of rules, each set corresponds to one entity, and there are other two sets of rules for
events that are not related to the target-entities. These are events that do not contain the
fields source.asn and destination.asn or if these two fields are present, and their values do
not correspond to any AS number of the target entities. If the condition of these two last
sets of rules are met, then it is added to the event the field event description.text with the
value ”others”. Figure 4.7 shows an example of the modify configuration file with one set
of rules for a target-entity and the two sets of rules for events that are not related to the
entities.
Figure 4.7: Modify Configuration Rule Sets
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Following the modify-expert-bot are the filter-expert-bots. There is a filter-bot for each
target-entity and one filter-bot for the events that are not related to the target-entities. The
events are filtered according to the field event description.text, which was added previ-
ously by the modify-expert-bot and its corresponding value, which is the unique identifier
of each target-entity. The filter-bots have a configuration named filter action which has
two options, keep or drop the events, in this case they were configured to keep the events.
Then the filtered events are sent to the ”Pipeline Exit Point” as shown on figure 4.4. The
”Exit Point” is composed by different output-bots, these could be file texts, at least one
per entity, or other type of outputs such as databases or platforms for data analysis.
4.5 Case 2: IP Addresses Second Pipeline
While this project was being developed, IntelMQ suffered several updates which forced a
change on the previous pipeline. The major update was in the format of the configuration
file for the modify-expert-bot. In the the previous version, the modify-expert-bot would go
through all the sets of rules in a random order, which could cause problems. For example,
the random order did not guarantee that the bot would reach all the set of rules, and if it
missed one, the events could not be filtered correctly. So, in order to avoid this problem,
the configuration file was updated, as well as the bot modus operandi. Currently, the bot
goes through every rule from the beginning to the end of the file, this way all the rules are
read by the bot.
Now, the configuration file does not have rule sets but only specific rules, in the pre-
vious version was possible to have a set of rules dedicated only to an entity, now the
configuration file has a list of rules. Every rule has a name, and if the event contains a
field with a certain value and it matches with the rule in the file, then another field-value
pair will be added to the event. This logic is practically equal to the previous version of
the modify-expert-bot. Figure 4.8 shows the new format of the configuration file for the
modify-expert-bot.
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Figure 4.8: New Modify Configuration File
From figure 4.8 is possible to observe that the first rule has the name entity-A destination asn
and if in the event there is the field destination.asn with the value ”64513”, then the field
event description.text with the value A is added to the event, and so on with the remaining
rules.
After this change, the pipeline had to be updated because the modify configuration
file lost the rule sets according to each target-entity. The events were no longer filtered
correctly. It was necessary to add to the pipeline a modify-expert-bot per entity, where
each of them had their own configuration file, with rules that belonged to the respective
target-entity. Figure 4.9 shows the new pipeline after the update of IntelMQ.
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Figure 4.9: New IntelMQ Pipeline
By observing figure 4.9 is possible to verify that the asn-lookup-bot was kept in the
same position. Then is followed by a general modify-expert-bot, this bot has a configu-
ration file that contains all the rules of the target-entities and of the events that are not
related to the entities. The general modify-expert-bot is necessary in cases where an event
that belongs to a target-entity has fields with wrong values. For example, let’s suppose
there are three target-entities: A, B and C. And as input Cyber Intelligence feed we have
figure 4.10.
In figure 4.10 every line of the input feed represents an event. The event in the red
rectangle has a destination.ip that belongs to entity-A and a source.ip that is unknown.
This event also contains the field event description.text, however this field has the value
C and it should have the value A because this event has an IP address that belongs to
entity-A. So, when this event reaches the general modify-expert-bot the value of the field
event description.text will be replaced by the correct one, because this bot has all the rules
that belong to the target-entities. And when this event reaches the specific modify-expert-
bot for entity-A, it will reinforce the rule making sure that the field event description.text
has the correct value.
Another situation where the general modify-expert-bot is useful, is when there are
events that involves more than one target-entity, like the event in the green rectangle in
figure 4.10. This event needs to be filtered by the dcy-A-filter-expert and also by the dcy-
C-filter-expert, because the destination.ip belongs to entity-A and the source.ip belongs
to entity-C. The filter-key for all events is the field event description.text, which in this
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Figure 4.10: Example of a Cyber Intelligence Feed
case has the value B, so this value must be corrected for both entities. The general modify-
expert-bot will correct this value for entity-A, because the rules in its configuration are
in alphabetic order, then when the event reaches the dcy-A-modify-expert the rules will be
reinforced to make sure that all the fields have the correct values for entity-A. But when
the event reaches the dcy-C-modify-expert, the field event description.text will still have
the value A, because of the general modify-expert-bot. So, the dcy-C-modify-expert will
correct the value to C, because this event also belongs to entity-C.
In the pipeline, after the modify-bots there are the filter-bots, one per entity and another
for events that are not related to the target-entities. As mentioned previously, the filter-key
used by all the filter-bots is the field event description.text, for example the value for this
field for entities A, B and C are exactly A, B and C. All the entity filters are configured to
keep the events, in order to send them to a file or to another type of output. However, there
is a difference between the filters of the target-entities and the filter for others events.
It is very difficult to identify all the events that are not related to the target-entities,
because it is not known what characterises them. But, what is known, is what char-
acterises every single target-entity. Hereupon, it was added to the dcy-others-modify-
expert-bot configuration file, rules that belong to the target-entities, but instead of giv-
ing the values A, B or C according to the respective target-entity, it was added the field
event description.target with the value entities, because those rules belong to the them.
Therefore, the filter-bot for the events that are not related to the target-entities is con-
figured to drop the events that are related to the target-entities, according to the key
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event description.target and the value entities, in this way the bot will filter the events
that do not belong to the target-entities.
Figure 4.11: Example of Rules in the dcy-others-modify-expert Configuration File
The above figure represents two rules for the AS numbers of the target-entities in the
configuration file of the dcy-others-modify-expert. Both rules contain a regular expres-
sion, a sequence of symbols and characters expressing a string or pattern to be searched
for, within a longer piece of text. In this case it represents the range 64512 to 65534
inclusive. If an AS number is found within this range, then is added to event the field
event description.target with the value entities.
Figure 4.12: Configuration Example for dcy-others-filter-expert
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Figure 4.13: Configuration Example for entity-filter-expert
Figures 4.12 and 4.13 represent the configuration for the filter-bots, the filter action
used, keep or drop, the filter key and the filter value are in the red rectangles.
4.6 Case 3: FQDNs and URLs
Following the filtering of IP addresses of the target-entities, it was necessary to filter
events that contained FQDNs and URLs of the entities. For this, it was not necessary to
change the previous pipeline, which means that was not required to add more bots to it.
The only change made was in the modify-expert-bots. It was added to the modify-
expert-bots configuration files, rules involving the FQDNs and the URLs of the target-
entities. For example, if an event contained an URL that belonged to entity-A, then it
was added to the event the field event description.text with the value A. All the rules
were duplicated, because the FQDNs and URLs in the events might come as source or
destination, so there are two rules for each FQDN and URL, as shown in figure 4.14.
Figure 4.14: Example of Rules for URLs
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To filter the events that are not related to the target-entities, it was applied the same
logic as for the IP addresses. The configuration file of the dcy-others-modify-expert, con-
tains rules related to the FQDNs and URLs, but instead of adding the corresponding value
associated to the entity, it adds the value entities this way the dcy-others-filter-expert will
recognise which events are related to the target-entitites and will drop them, leaving only
the ”others” events.
Figure 4.15: Example of Rules of the dcy-others-modify-expert Configuration File
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4.7 Maltego to IntelMQ Architecture
This section describes the overall architecture between Maltego and IntelMQ and the
expected outputs from it.
Figure 4.16: IntelMQ Configuration Manager Architecture
Figure 4.16 shows an overview of the architecture between Maltego, IntelMQ and the
Ruby program which generates the configurations for IntelMQ. At the left side of the
figure there are the target-entities, they must be known and defined before the progress
of the project. After this, they were mapped and scouted by Maltego and it was found
their most relevant attributes. The captured information was then manually transformed
into YAML format. Each entity has their own YAML file with their IP addresses, URLs
and FQDNs. These YAML files served as input for the Ruby program that generates the
configuration files for IntelMQ. The Ruby program also needs as input an extra YAML
file, that contains the destination or origin file paths for the creation of the configuration
files and it also contains bots configurations. The Ruby program then returns several
files as output, namely: ASN database, various modify configuration files and the files
runtime.conf and pipeline.conf. All the files are sent to the correct directory, this way
IntelMQ can read them automatically.
4.8 Conclusion
This chapter described how the solution to filter the events related to the target-entities
was found. It explained the requirements that the Ruby program must reach. How the
public information on the target-entities was collected by Maltego and what set of trans-
forms were used to reach this goal. It also explains how the metadata from Maltego
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was transformed into YAML format. Then it is described the evolution of the IntelMQ
pipelines for the correct filtering of events, this also includes a detailed description of the
configuration files and bots configurations. Finally, it was explained a general overview
of the architecture between Maltego, IntelMQ and the Ruby Program.
The following chapter describes the implementation of the Ruby program, its meth-
ods and functions that are responsible for the generation of the configuration files, bots
configurations and the generation of the pipeline, which filters the events accordingly.
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Chapter 5
Implementation
This chapter describes the Ruby program that was developed for this project, the program
was named as ”intelmq configurations generator.rb”. Its main goal was to generate all
the configuration files for the modify-expert-bots, generate the ASN database, the config-
urations for the the filter-expert-bots and the files runtime.conf and pipeline.conf, which
contain all the bots configurations and their connections in the pipeline.
The program uses the YAML files that contain information of the target-entities to
generate all the configurations files, these files will contain the rules for the correct filter-
ing of the events. The program also uses an extra YAML file, that contains the paths from
where the configuration files must be created, the bots names and configurations and also
some commands to be executed by IntelMQ.
The first section of this chapter describes the building blocks of the Ruby script ”in-
telmq configurations generator.rb”. The second section describes IntelMQ configuration
YAML file, its content and its purpose for the Ruby program. The third section starts
describing the first part of the code, which is the generation of entities objects with their
attributes from the YAML files. The fourth section explains how the asn-lookup-expert
and its database was generated, how the configurations files for the modify-expert-bots
were created and also how the configurations of the filter-expert were made. The follow-
ing sections explain how the files runtime.conf and pipeline.conf were generated. Section
5.7 describes the command line switch that was created to execute the different functions
of the Ruby program in a terminal. The last section of this chapter summarises all the
outputs, that the ”intelmq configurations generator.rb” generates.
5.1 IntelMQ Configurations Generator Overview
The purpose of this section is to describe the overall functioning of the the Ruby program,
developed for this project. Figure 5.1 shows an overview of the different sections of the
program.
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Figure 5.1: IntelMQ Configurations Generator Overview
On the left side of the figure are the input files for the program, these are the target-
entity YAMLs, and the IntelMQ YAML file, which is described in detail in section 5.2.
The first methods of the Ruby script are responsible for the reading of the YAMLs of the
target-entities, and create entities objects, this way will be possible to use their informa-
tion throughout the whole program, without any losses.
The next section of the script is called ”Bots Generator”, it generates the ASN database,
the configurations files for the modify-expert-bots and the configurations for the filter-
experts-bots and output-bots. Following is the ”Runtime Generator”, and as its name
indicates it generates the file runtime.conf, this file contains all the bots configurations.
To generate runtime.conf, the methods in ”Runtime Generator” use functions from the
section ”Bots Generator”.
Then there is the section ”Pipeline Generator”, this is where the file pipeline.conf is
generated, this file contains the connections between the bots.
The script also contains a method responsible of the restart of the IntelMQ Pipeline,
this method does not use any information of the previous methods. It executes commands
that belong to the framework Intelmqctl, which was explained in chapter 3.
Finally, there is the ”Command Line Switch” which is responsible for executing the
methods through the command line.
Throughout this chapter it will be explained in detail every section of the Ruby pro-
gram ”intelmq configurations generator.rb”.
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5.2 IntelMQ Configuration File
This section describes the YAML file with configurations for IntelMQ, which served as
input for the intelmq configurations generator.rb, in order to generate all the necessary
configuration files for the project. The file contains all the static information necessary
for the Ruby program and it is composed by field names and their respective values, the
program reaches the values by using the field names.
This file is organised in different sections, the first part contains the bots names, the
prefix to be used in the bots that were generated by the Ruby program, which works as
an identifier for these bots. In this case, the prefix used was ”dcy”, because these are the
initials of the department where the project was developed - Direc¸a˜o de Cyber Security
and Privacy (DCY). All the bots generated by the Ruby program will have the prefix
”dcy”. This section also contains the entrance point for the pipeline generated by the
program. This way the generated pipeline can be attached to any bot that was already in
IntelMQ and which is specified in this YAML file. Figure 5.2 shows the bots names and
tags used in this project, as well as, the entrance point for the pipeline.
Figure 5.2: First Section of the IntelMQ Configuration YAML File
The next section is composed by commands to run the program Intelmqctl, which was
described on chapter 4. These commands are necessary in cases where the pipeline that
was generated by ”intelmq configurations generator.rb” is no longer necessary, and it is
necessary to remove the pipeline from IntelMQ, the bots must be stopped before deleting
the pipeline. Or if for some reason the bots crash or block, the best way to solve this issue
is to restart them, once again is used the approriate command to do so. The following
figure demonstrates examples of the commands to execute Intelmqctl.
Chapter 5. Implementation 56
Figure 5.3: Intelmqctl Commands
The following section (figure 5.4) contains all the static parts to be used in the rule
names for the modify-expert-bots configuration files. These rules names contain the
source / destination AS numbers and source / destination FQDN and URL.
Figure 5.4: Modify Rule Names
Following the previous section, there are the paths of the files runtime.conf and pipeline.conf
and the path to the directory which contains all the target-entity YAML files. Next, there
are the paths of the files to be created by the Ruby program, it contains the paths for the
modify-expert-bots configuration files, the ASN database and backups of the runtime.conf
and pipeline.conf files, as figure 5.5 shows.
Figure 5.5: Paths for the Configuration Files
Finally, figure 5.6 presents the last section of this file, it is composed by the configu-
rations of the bots used in the pipeline, such as the asn-lookup-expert, the modify-experts
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and the filter-experts bots. The bots configuration is kept in this file, because most of them
contain static information, while in the Ruby program there should be only dynamic data.
Figure 5.6: Bots Configurations
5.3 Entities Generator
This section describes how the entity objects were developed in the Ruby program.
An object-oriented program involves classes and objects. A class is the blueprint from
which individual objects are created. In object-oriented terms, is said that an entity is an
instance of the class of objects known as entities [46].
The part of the code which generates the entity objects is called Entities Genera-
tor and is by a class named Entity and two methods named read network addresses and
load yaml. The class Entity declares and initialises all the attributes for an entity object,
these are the same as in the target-entities YAML files. The method read network addresses
saves the different sections of IP addresses or network names into separate arrays from
the entities YAML files. However, if a target-entity does not have IP addresses or only
contains one of the three types of network addresses (single IP, range or subnet) or net-
work names (URLs, FQDNs or domains), it ignores the missing or non-existing network
addresses / names.
The previous method is followed by load yaml method, which is the most complex
part of the Entities Generator. The first part of load yaml method is to find all the entity
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YAML files in the given directory in the intelmq .conf (shown in the previous section, this
file contains all the paths of the YAML files). The method searches in the given directory
all the files with the extension ”.yaml”. Then, each file is opened and it id verified if the
files do not contain any errors, if they are in the correct YAML format and if they have
the correct syntax. After opening the files, all the content from the network addresses
and network names is saved into arrays through the method read network addresses, this
happens if they are present in the YAML files, otherwise it will ignore the absent fields.
The method load yaml, also adds the AS numbers dynamically to each entity object, this
way is avoided repeated AS numbers and is ensured they are in the range 64512 to 65534.
To build the entity objects, the function also uses a map / dictionary of fields from the
entities YAML files. This map helps the main function to reach the desired fields in the
YAML files.
5.4 Bots Generator
This section describes how the Ruby program generates the ASN database used by the
asn-lookup-expert, the configuration files for the modify-expert-bots and the configura-
tions for the filter-expert-bots used in the pipeline. Therefore, this section is divided into
three subsections, each one belongs to one type of expert bots. The first subection is fo-
cused in the creation of the AS database for the asn-lookup-expert, the second subsection
describes the code for the creation of the configuration files for each modify-expert and
the third subsection explains the development of the configurations for the filter-experts.
5.4.1 ASN-Lookup-Expert / ASN Database
This subsection, as mentioned previously, describes how the ASN database is generated
by the Ruby program.
The method which originates the ASN database is called write asn database. The
first part of this method consists on the writing of the header of the database. The header
for the database is in the intelmq conf.yaml. An enhancement for this header it would be
if it was built dynamically everytime the database was created or updated, because the
header should contain the date of creation and the total number of IPv4 and / or IPv6
addresses in the database. This was not made during the project, because the main goal
of this database is having the correct IP addresses and AS numbers, the header is just a
reference for its content.
After writing the header to a file, the next part of the method write asn database will
get the single IP addresses, ranges and subnets from the entities objects, generated by the
method load yaml, described on the previous section. Each of the network addresses type
will be merged into the CIDR format and then saved into an array. The merging process
allows to reduce the number of IP addresses, for example, a target-entity might have
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several single IP addresses which belong to the same range, by merging them is possible
to reduce the quantity of IP addresses. After merging each network type separatly, all
the network types were merged once again (single IP addresses, ranges and subnets), on
this second merge they were already in the CIDR format, reducing again the number of
IP addresses to be written in the database. After reducing the quantity of IP addresses
by merging them, they were written to the database with the corresponding AS number,
according to the target-entity. They were written as pairs of IP addresses / AS numbers,
which means that the database has two columns, one for IP addresses and another for the
corresponding AS numbers, as shown in chapter 4 in figure 4.5.
The name for the database and the directory where it should be written and saved is
specified in the intelmq conf.yaml.
5.4.2 Modify-Expert-Bots
Following the method that generates the ASN database, there are the methods which
generate the configuration files for the modify-expert-bots. To build the rules with these
methods, it was used a template file, named modify template.json with all the static field
names for the rules, as shown in figure 5.7.
Figure 5.7: Rule Example from modify template.json
The first method is called generate modify url fqdn, this method constructes the rules
for the URLs and FQDNs of the target-entities and they are separated into four sets of
rules: destination fqdn, source fqdn, destination url and source url. For each set, the
method gets the template rules that are in the modify template file, afterwards it fills each
rule with data from the target-entities.
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Figure 5.8: Template Rules for Each Set of Rules for the Target Entities
Figure 5.9: Filling of the Rule Sets for the FQDNs
In figure 5.8 is possible to observe the creation of the four sets of rules, then the file
modify template.json is read by the method and the static names of the rules were added to
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each rule set. While adding the static names to the rule sets is used a Ruby Module named
”Marshal”. This module converts collections of Ruby objects into a byte stream, allowing
them to be stored outside the currently active script. This allows to create a shallow copy
of the Ruby object, being possible to alter the copied object without changing the original
[1]. Without this module, all the rule sets would have the same values, which would cause
problems during the filtering of the events.
The next part of the method is responsible for the filling of the rules with the URLs
and FQDNs of the target-entities, as shown in figure 5.9. For this it is used the classifica-
tion id, the entity name and the URL and FQDN of each target-entity. It was also added
a counter to each rule name, in order to avoid repetition in the rule names, for example:
entity-A source url 1”. All the rules are numerated, making each rule name different
from the previous. Then the rules are all saved into an array.
The next method is called generate special modify url fqdn and is very similar to the
method generate modify url fqdn. The difference is in the field to be added in the event
and its value. In the previous method the rule contained the field event description.text
and value added to it was the classification id of the corresponding target-entity, while in
this method the rule contains the field event description.target and the value added to
it is the tag entities. As mentioned previously, these rules are meant for the dcy-others-
modify-expert, in order to filter the events that are not related to the target-entities.
Figure 5.10: Special Rules Filling
Figure 5.10 shows a fragment of code which demonstrates the field name to be added
to the event and its value in the method generate special modify url fqdn. Once again,
all the rules were saved into an array.
The following method’s name is generate modify entities. This method writes the
rules that belong to the target-entities into separate files. In other words, it generates the
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modify configuration files for each modify-expert-bot of each target-entity. The content
of this method is similar to the previous two methods, however it also adds rules related
to AS numbers of the target-entities and instead of saving the rules into an array, they are
written directly to the corresponding files.
Figure 5.11: Entities Rules Writing
Figure 5.12: Others Rules Writing
By observing figure 5.11, is possible verify the code part that creates the rules for the
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AS numbers of the target-entities and also how the rules are written into separate files,
each file corresponding to one target-entity. The path to where the files must be written
and their names are in the intelmq conf.yaml, which was described in the second section
of this chapter.
The next method is responsible for the writing of the rules of the events that are not
related to the target-entities. The name of the method is generate others modify file. Its
structure is similar to the previous methods. However, the set of rules is different, this file
contains rules for events that do not contain AS numbers, or if they contain AS numbers
they are different from the AS numbers of the target-entities. All the rules are saved into
an array. This method calls the function generate special modify url fqdn and writes its
output to the file along with the rules of the different AS numbers.
In figure 5.12 is possible to observe the rule sets for the different types of AS numbers
and the rule sets for events that do not contain AS numbers being saved into the array.
Then the method generate special modify url fqdn is called and each rule of this method
is also saved in the array. Finally, the file for these rules is generated and all the rules in
the array are written in it.
The following method, generate modify content, generates the content for the config-
uration file of the general modify-expert, which is the bot next to the asn-lookup-expert-
bot in the pipeline. As mentioned previously, the general modify-expert contains all the
rules that belong to the target-entities and also the rules that are not related to them, the
content of the configuration files of the modify-experts of each target-entity are written to
this general file, as well as the rules of the ASN numbers that do not belong to the target-
entities. Following this method is the function that generates the general configuration file
by writing the output of the generate modify content. It was created a method only for
the writing of the file, because this way is given the possibility to name the file differently
from what is specified in the intelmq conf.yaml.
Figure 5.13 presents the code for the writing of the general modify-expert configura-
tion file. If a name for the file to be created is not given, then it is used the specified name
in the intelmq conf.yaml, then it calls the method generate modify content and writes its
output into the file. Otherwise, the file will be created with the given name and it follows
the same logic as the first part of the code, by calling the method generate modify content
and writing its output.
The last method related to this section is the generate modify bots entities. This
method is responsible for the generation of the configurations for the modify-expert-bots
for each target-entity. The general modify-expert-bot is generated by a method in the
Runtime section of this chapter.
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Figure 5.13: Method to Generate the General Modify Configuration File
Figure 5.14: Method That Generates the Modify-Experts-Bots for Each Target-Entity
The above figure shows the method generate modify bots entities. The first part of
the method gets all the necessary information from the file intelmq conf.yaml, the general
configuration, bot name and name of the configuration file for the modify-expert-bot, the
path where the configuration files must be written and the tag which identifies each bot
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generated by the Ruby program. The following part, attributes dynamically the configu-
ration file name according to an entity. For example, if there are ten target-entities, then it
will be generated ten modify-expert-bots, each one with a configuration file correspond-
ing to the respective entity. Then each bot configuration is saved into an hash, under a
specific name related to the target-entity. These configurations will be then written into
the runtime.conf file, which will be explained in more detail in section 5.5 of this chapter.
5.4.3 Filter-Expert-Bots
Following the last method from the previous section, there is the method generate filter bots.
The first part of this function gets all the necessary information for the construction of
the configurations for the filter-bots. These are the general configuration set, name and
tag for the bots identification. Then the attributes of each target-entity are added to the
configurations dynamically, in order to have a configuration per entity. Finally, all the
configurations are added to an hash, and once again, the hash with the configurations will
be used by the method which reproduces the runtime.conf file.
5.5 Runtime Generator
This section describes the methods which are responsible for the reproduction of the run-
time.conf file. This part of the code is composed by three methods, the first method is
responsible of reading the ”original” runtime.conf file, this file already exists on IntelMQ
and it contains the configurations of the bots that are in use in IntelMQ. After reading the
file, the method converts its content into an hash and it is added to this hash the configura-
tions of the bots that are responsible for the correct filtering of Cyber Intelligence events
according to the attributes of the target-entities. The second method of this section writes
the hash generated by the previous method into a file, and it also creates two backup files,
the first backup is of the original configuration and the second is a copy of the new con-
figuration, both files are created with a timestamp, in order to maintain a track of when
they were created. The third method is responsible for the elimination of the bots that
were added to runtime.conf to filter the events that belong to the target-entities. This last
method allows to clear up the pipeline, returning it to its original state, without the bots
that were generated by the Ruby program. This is useful in cases where it is necessary to
change the target-entities, so the bots are removed from the pipeline and then the script is
executed again but with new entities, and new bots with new configurations.
As mentioned previously, the first method of this section reads the original runtime.conf
file and returns an hash with the configurations that were already in the file and also the
new configurations of the bots that will filter the Cyber Intelligence events related to the
target-entities. This method is called read runtime and figure 5.15 and shows the first part
of this method. The first part of the method is responsible of the reading of the file run-
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time.conf and transform it into an hash. Then it is collected all the necessary information
from the intelmq conf.yaml file to build the bot names and configurations which filter the
events of the target-entities. It also calls functions that were described previously in this
chapter, such as the generate modify bots entities and generate filter bots. The output of
these methods is added to the hash, completing it with all the required configurations.
Figure 5.15: Reading of runtime.conf
The following method is named write runtime, and it is responsible of writting the
output of the read runtime into the runtime.conf file. It also creates a backup of the origi-
nal configurations, adding a timestamp to the file name and another backup file containing
the content of the new generated file. These backup files are useful for debug purposes
and to keep a record of all the changes made to the file (before and after).
The last method of this section deletes all the bots which contain the tag ”dcy” from
the runtime.conf file, in other words, it deletes the bots that were generated by the Ruby
program. Before deleting the bots, this method stops them first in IntelMQ, this step
avoids the loss of information before deleting the bots. After stopping the bots, the method
executes the deletion part, and writes a new clean runtime.conf file.
5.6 Pipeline Generator
After writting the bots configurations is necessary to create the links between them, in
order to have a logical pipeline. This section describes the methods responsible for the
creation of the connections between the bots that were generated by the Ruby program,
but also the connection of these new bots to the existing pipeline on IntelMQ. Simi-
larly, to the previous section, the Pipeline Generator is also composed by three meth-
ods, read pipeline, write pipeline and clean pipeline. The first method reads the original
pipeline file, it also converts its content into an hash, aftewards its added to it the queues of
bots creating the connections between them. The second method writes the output hash of
the previous method, following the same logic as the writing method for the runtime.conf
file, a backup of the original pipeline.conf file is written, as well as a copy of the new
generated pipeline.conf file. The last method removes the queues that belong to the bots
that were generated by the Ruby program, returning the file pipeline.conf to its original
state.
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The first part of the method read pipeline reads the existing pipeline.conf file and
saves its content to an hash, and as other methods described previously, it also fetches
the required information to build the new pipeline from the intelmq conf.yaml file. In this
case, it fetches information about the bots names, the tag to be used also in their names
and the entrance point. The entrance point is the bot name where the new pipeline is
going to be attached to. This method also generates an hash per bot, each hash contains
the source-queue and destination-queues for every bot, only the output-bots do not con-
tain destination-queues, as they are the end of the pipeline. The source and destination
queues are the bot names where the events must pass through, and the queues create the
connections between the bots. The next part of the method verifies if already exists a
destination-queue in the entrance point, if exists, it adds the first bot of the new pipeline,
which is the asn-expert-bot, otherwise it adds the destination-queue to the entrance point
and again it creates the asn-expert-bot, as seen in figure 5.16.
Figure 5.16: Connection of ASN-expert to the Existing Pipeline
Then its created the source and destination queues for the asn-expert-bot, and it was
added to the destination-queue the bot following the asn-expert in the pipeline, which is
the modify-expert. This process, the generation of the source and destination queues is
repeated for every single bot in the pipeline. The queues related to the target-entities are
created dynamically and it is used their names and unique identifier to build their source
and destination queues, as shown in figure 5.17.
All the generated hashes, with the source and destination queues for every bot are then
saved into the ”main hash”, that was previously created by the reading of the pipeline.conf
file at the beginning of this method. Finally, the queues inside of the ”main hash” are
ordered alphabetically.
The next method of this section is equivalent to the writing method of the Runtime
Generator. The method write pipeline writes the output of the function read pipeline into
the file pipeline.conf and it is also generated backup files, one of the original configuration
(before adding the new bots) and another with the new pipeline, both files are generated
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with a timestamp in their names.
Finally, the method clean pipeline removes the queues that were generated by the
Ruby program, returning a clean file. This method searches for the given tag to the bots,
in this case it was used the tag ”dcy”, and it deletes all the queues that contain this tag.
Then is returned the new and clean pipeline which contains only the ”original” bots.
Figure 5.17: Entities Source and Destination Queues
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5.7 Command Line Switch
For the execution of the ”intelmq configurations generator.rb” it was necessary to create
a Command Line Switch, which gives several options to execute the program via com-
mand line. The first part of the Command Line Switch is where the commands to execute
the program are parsed. For the parsing it is used a Ruby Class named GetoptLong, it
allows a POSIX (Portable Operating System Interface)-style options like –file, as well as
single letter options like -f, as shown in figure 5.18.
Figure 5.18: Parsing of the Command Line Options
The following part is where all the methods are called to be executed, according to
the given command. For example, by examining figure 5.19, is possible to verify that the
command – execute or -e executes all the methods at once, meaning that all configurations
files will be generated at the same time. Another example is, if the command –asn or -a is
used, then only the file which contains the ASN database will be generated. By executing
the methods separately is an easier way for debugging, in cases where a method fails to
execute or to produce the expected output. The –help command prints to the command
line all the existing options to execute correctly the Ruby program.
Figure 5.19: Command Line Options
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5.8 Outputs
The purpose of this section is to summarise the obtained outputs from the methods de-
scribed earlier in this chapter. Figure 5.20 shows a schema of the outputs of each method.
Figure 5.20: Generated Outputs
The files generated for this project were the following:
• ASN database
• General modify-expert configuration file
• Entities modifies-experts configuration files
• Others modify-expert configuration file
• Runtime.conf
• Pipeline.conf
By generating these files with the correct configurations, IntelMQ is ready and pre-
pared to filter the events, according to the attributes of each target-entity.
5.9 Conclusion
This chapter described the implementation of the Ruby program, which generates all the
configurations files necessary to filter Cyber Intelligence events, according to a set of
attributes of the target-entities, through IntelMQ. This implementation was divided into
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separate sections, and each one is responsible for the production of a set of configuration
files. The first section explains the structure of the program as a whole, while the follow-
ing sections describe in more detail every method and how they work. It is also explained
how the program is executed and what commands are necessary to run it. The last section
of this chapter shows a summary of all the configuration files that were generated by the
program.
The next chapter shows the tests that were made to the program and the results ob-
tained, to understand if the new pipeline and the corresponding configuration files can
filter the events, according to the attributes of the target-entities.
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Chapter 6
Results and Evaluation
After developing the Ruby program, which is responsible for the generation of config-
uration files and rule sets for the filtering of Cyber Intelligence events, according to the
most relevant attributes of the target-entities, it was necessary to verify, evaluate and to
understand if the events were being filtered correctly. This chapter presents the results
obtained of the filtering of Cyber Intelligence events by IntelMQ using the configurations
generated by the program ”intelmq configurations generator.rb”. It is explained the test
conditions, in other words, how the test was performed and then it is made an analysis of
the obtained results.
6.1 Test Conditions
To perform the test to verify if the events were filtered correctly, IntelMQ was installed
in a machine with Red Hat Enterprise Linux (RHEL) operating system, with 95GB of
disk space, 20GB of RAM and 8 CPUs. IntelMQ processes millions of events, so it was
necessary a robust machine to perform the test. IntelMQ was up and running between the
11th of July to the 10th of August, the test had the duration of 30 days, this range of days
allows to have a better confidence on the final results.
The original IntelMQ pipeline (the pipeline that was already on IntelMQ) was com-
posed by 108 collector-bots, 98 parser-bots and 15 expert-bots. The Cyber Intelligence
Feeds from where the collector-bots retrieved the events were described on table 3.1 from
the third chapter. After executing the ”intelmq configurations generator.rb” it was added
to the original pipeline 33 bots (experts and outputs) for the target-entities. In total the
final pipeline had 254 bots, and its structure is shown in figure 6.1.
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Figure 6.1: IntelMQ Final Pipeline
Figure 6.1 shows the final format of the IntelMQ pipeline, the pipeline generated by
the Ruby script is on the left side of the image, and is composed by expert-bots (blue) and
output-bots (yellow).
For the test it was used the entities A, B, C and D, with information that was found
by Maltego, as described previously. However, it was created three more entities with IP
addresses which belong to entities A, C and D. These IP addresses were retrieved by the
Cyber Watch Program of DCY. These entities were named as entity-A1, entity-C1 and
entity-D1, to differ from the others with information found by Maltego. Table 6.1 shows
the total of IP addresses provided by the Cyber Watch Program, for each entity.
The test was performed with the total of 7 entities, with the duration of 30 days and
with the purpose of filter events, according to the attributes of each target-entity (IP ad-
dresses, FQDNs and URLs).
Table 6.1: Entities Total Events
Entities Number of IP Addresses
A1 78
C1 517
D1 23
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6.2 Analysis of Results
This section describes the results obtained by the filtering of events. First, it is given an
overall analysis of the filtering, then is made an analysis for each entity, and finally it is
made an analysis of the type of events that were filtered by IntelMQ.
6.2.1 Global Analysis
As mentioned previously, IntelMQ was up and running for 30 days straight. In total, it
filtered 64,816,823 events, where 330,525 belong to the target-entities and 64,486,298
are related to others events. Figure 6.2 shows a graph of the total of events filtered by
IntelMQ during the 30 days.
Figure 6.2: Daily Total Events
By observing figure 6.2 is possible to verify that, for most of the days, IntelMQ filtered
around 1,000,000 of events, a part from the days between the 24th and 31st of July. This de-
crease in the filtering of events was due to adjustments made to the collector-bots. Every
collector-bot retrieves information from the Cyber Intelligence Feeds in certain periods of
time, for example, every hour the collector-bot fetches a report of events. However, most
of the Cyber Intelligence Feeds are updated once a day, or once a week, meaning that if
the collector-bot was configured to get the reports hourly, it would get repeated events,
consuming resources and time unnecessarily. So, the collector-bots were reconfigured
to retrieve the information, according to the time that the Cyber Intelligence Feed was
updated.
To avoid an extreme resource consumption on the machine where IntelMQ was run-
ning, another adjustment was made, which was also responsible for the decreasing of
events, in the mentioned period of time. The collector-bots had to fetch the reports inter-
calated, this way was possible to create a balance in the machine resources, allowing to
IntelMQ to run without problems. For example, if the machine ran out of RAM, due to
extreme resources consumption, i. e., collector-bots fetching the information at the same
time, IntelMQ would stop running. The solution found to this problem, it was to turn
off some collector-bots, for a small period of time (10 / 15 minutes), and turning them
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back on at different times, this way they would get the reports intercalated, creating the
necessary balance in the machine resources.
After the adjustments, the number of events filtered daily was very consistent, being
between 1,000,000 to 2,000,000 of events. Some days have more events than others,
because the size of the reports of the Cyber Intelligence Feeds vary according to the
number of events reported on that day or week.
6.2.2 Global Entities Analysis
This subsection presents the global analysis of the filtered events on the target-entities.
Table 6.2 summarises the total of events filtered for each target-entity.
Table 6.2: Entities Total Events
Entities Total Events
A 1,134
A1 318,912
B 0
C 0
C1 10,377
D 194
D1 0
By observing table 6.2 is possible to verify that the entity with the highest number
of events is entity-A1, followed by entity-C1 with the second highest number of events,
then there are entities A and D. Entities B, C and D1 have zero events.
One of the reasons why entity-B has none events, it might be because of the size of
the organisation, it is a very small company and less likely to be a target of attacks.
The obtained metadata on entity-C by Maltego was a very small sample, when com-
pared to the other entities (see table 4.1), this could be a reason of why entity-C has none
events. Its attributes found by Maltego were not used as targets, or they were not reported
on the used Cyber Intelligence Feeds. However, its IP addresses from Cyber Watch were
involved in several events, as seen on table 6.2 (entity-C1).
Entity-D1 has zero events, because the IP addresses provided by Cyber Watch were
not involved in malicious activities, or they were not reported on the used Cyber Intelli-
gence Feeds. However, the metadata found by Maltego on entity-D was composed mainly
by DNSs and URLs (see table 4.1) and most of the events filtered for this entity involved
more network names than network addresses (this will be explained in more detail in
subsection 6.2.5).
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6.2.3 Entities A and A1
In this subsection it is presented the results obtained of the filtering of events during the
30-day test on entities A and A1, they represent the same entity, however entity-A has
metadata provided by Maltego, while entity-A1 has IP addresses obtained by the Cyber
Watch Program.
Entity-A
Figure 6.3 presents the graph of the daily filtering of events for entity-A, during 30 days.
Figure 6.3: Daily Events of Entity-A
By observing figure 6.3 is possible to verify that the daily pattern of the filtering of
events for entity-A matches with the daily total of events (figure 6.2). At the beginning of
the test the number of filtered events was higher, then it decreased between 24th and 31st
of July due to the adjustments made to the collector-bots, after this period the number of
events increased.
The maximum of events reached in one day was on the 12th of July and the 28th of
July, with the total of 286 and 208 events, respectively, while on the other days the average
of events is around 65. During the 30-day period there were 15 days with none events.
The type of events filtered for entity-A, involved only its IP addresses, there were not
any events containing URLs and / or FQDNs belonging to this entity.
As mentioned previously, the total of events filtered for entity-A was 1,134, where
only 123 were unique. It is very common to have repeated events on the Cyber Intelli-
gence feeds, because while they are not updated and / or the attack / vulnerability it is not
solved, the same event will be reported several times. The Cyber Intelligence feed that
reported 99% of the events for entity-A it was BitSight Ciberfeed Stream corresponding
to malware events, the remaining 1% belongs to the ShadowServer feed which reported
vulnerable services.
Entity-A1
The following graph shows the daily filtering of events for entity-A1.
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Figure 6.4: Daily Events of Entity-A1
The presented graph is similar to figure 6.3, however it contains a greater number of
filtered events per day. The peak of events in one day for entity-A1 was on the 28th of
July with the total of 27,446. The average of events on the remaining days where exists
filtered events is aproximately 20,813. Similarly to entity-A, there were 14 days with zero
events.
From the 318,912 events filtered for entity-A1, only 22 were unique events. As previ-
ously stated, the rules for the filtering of events for entity-A1 only had IP addresses, con-
sequently, the filtered events for this entity, only involved its IP addresses. Once again, the
Cyber Intelligence feed BitSight Ciberfeed Stream reported 99,9% of the events, which
are related to malware. The remaining 0,1% were reported by the feed ShadowServer,
where the events are related to vulnerable services.
Comparing both entities, A and A1, is interesting to verify that the obtained results
were very similar, despite entity-A1 had a greater quantity of events than entity-A.
Both entities only had events involving IP addresses, and the events were reported
by the same Cyber Intelligence feeds. The IP addresses found by Maltego and the ones
provided by Cyber Watch were different, meaning that both configuration files and, con-
sequently, the filtering of events for both entities, complemented each other, providing a
greater knowledge on the type of events where these entities were involved.
6.2.4 Entity-C1
On this subsection is presented the analysis of the filtering of events for entity-C1. Figure
6.5 presents the 30-day graph of the filtered events.
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Figure 6.5: Daily Events of Entity-C1
By observing figure 6.5 is possible to see that the daily pattern of the filtering of
events is very different from the previous entities. On the first week, there is higher
number of filtered events, then it decreases but the filtering is very consistent throughout
the remaining days. The day with the highest value of filtered events was the 11th of July
with the total of 1225 events. The average of events filtered per day for this entity is
around 345. There were events filtered for entity-C1 every day from the 30-day period.
The filtered events of entity-C1 only involved IP addresses, and there are 716 unique
events, in other words, unique IP addresses from the 10,377 events. The filtered events
for entity-C1 were reported from several Cyber Intelligence feeds, table 6.3 summarises
the total events reported by each feed for entity-C1, as well as the type of events that each
feed reported.
Table 6.3: Entity-C1 Total Events By Each Cyber Intelligence Feed
Feed Total Events Percentage of Events Type of Events
Abuse.ch Feodo IPs 57 0,55 Command & Control
AlienVault Reputation List 2547 24,5 Malware
AlienVault OTX 3 0,029 Blacklist
Bambenek C2 IPs 1 0,001 Command & Control
Blocklist.de 448 4,3 IDS Alert and Brute-Force
CI Army 5498 53 Blacklist
Danger Rulez 57 0,55 Brute-Force
DataPlane 830 8 Scanner and Brute-Force
NetLab360 117 1,12 Scanner
NoThink 29 0,28 DDoS
Taichung 237 2,28 Scanner and Malware
Turris Grey List 553 5,32 Scanner
Observing table 6.3 is possible to verify that the Cyber Intelligence feed, which re-
ported the majority of events for entity-C1, it was CI Army. This feed provided events
with black listed IP addresses, and represents 53% of the total filtered events. The second
largest percentage of events belongs to the feed AlienVault Reputation List, with 24,5%
and this feed reported events of the type malware.
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Comparing the filtered events for entity-C1 with the other entities, the filtered events
for entity-C1 are more diversified, the events were also reported from several feeds and
the type of the events vary as well. The filtering of events for entity-C1 were more diverse
and more consistent throughout the 30-day test than the others target-entities.
6.2.5 Entity-D
This subction presents the analysis of the filtered events for entity-D, figure 6.6 shows the
graph of the daily filtering of events during the test period.
Figure 6.6: Daily Events of Entity-D
Similarly, to the previous entity, the day with the maximum of filtered events it was
the 12th of July, with the total of 88 events. The first week of the test had more filtered
events then the following weeks, as previously shown. The average of events filtered per
day for this entity is around 6. There were 13 days with none events, during the test for
entity-D.
From the 194 events filtered for entity-D, 46 events are unique. These events involve
IP addresses, URLs and FQDNs from entity-D, where some of events contain these three
fields, while others only contain one of three fields. Table 6.4 shows the quantity of events
which contain the three fields or only one of them.
Table 6.4: Total Events per Field
Fields in the Event Total Events
IP Address, URL, FQDN 30
IP Address 86
FQDN 78
The majority of the events filtered for entity-D contain IP addresses, meaning that
most of them were filtered taking into account this field, while the events that only contain
the field FQDN, were filtered according to the rules for the FQDNs of the target-entity.
The filtered events for entity-D were provided by three different Cyber Intelligence
feeds. Table 6.5 presents the total of events reported by each Cyber Intelligence feed and
the type of events that each feed reported.
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Table 6.5: Entity-D Total Events By Each Cyber Intelligence Feed
Feed Total Events Percentage of Events Type of Events
BitSight Ciberfeed Stream 6 3,1 Malware
HP Hosts 78 40,2 Blacklist
ShadowServer 110 56,7 Malware
By observing table 6.5 is possible to verify that most of the events were reported by
ShadowServer, representing 56,7 of the reported events, the type of events that this feed
provided were related to malware. HP Hosts is the second feed with the largest amount of
reported events for entity-D, this feed provided events with black listed domains. Finally,
there is the feed BitSight Ciberfeed Stream representing 3,1 of the reported events and
providing information on events related to malware.
The events reported for entity-D are slightly different from the previous entities. For
this entity there are several events containing URLs and FQDNs, while the events on
the others target-entities are exclusively related to IP addresses. When comparing the
configuration files of all target-entities, entity-D had the largest number of FQDNs and
URLs, this might explain why this entity has events related to public network names.
6.3 Conclusion
The functioning of the filtering of events is measured through the obtained results showed
on this chapter. However, the results also depend on the metadata, which served as input
for the configurations for the filtering of the events. This means that, if there is rule for
a certain IP address / FQDN or URL and during the 30-day test there were no events
containing this network address / network name, it does not mean that the filtering did
not work, it means that the attribute of the target-entity was not involved in any malicious
activities.
There were seven target-entities for the 30-day test, and as shown on this chapter, there
were filtered events for four of the seven entities. From the entities scouted and mapped by
Maltego 2 out of 4 had filtered events. And the three entities with IP addresses provided
by Cyber Watch, 2 out of 3 had filtered events.
In cases where an attribute of a target-entity suffers an attack, or it is vulnerable or
it is involved in malicious activities, the event is filtered correctly, and it will be sent to
the respective file as well as to Hidra, being then possible to forensically analyse each
event. It is possible to conclude that the filtering of events does work, if the attribute of a
target-entity is in an event.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion and Future Work
Taking into account that business value, data and personal information are increasing and
rapidly migrating into a digital form on open and interconnected technology platforms,
the risks from cyberattacks become very intimidating. There are several ”enemies” that
an organisation should be aware of, from criminals that seek for financial gains through
fraud and identity theft, to rivals / competitors that steal intellectual property or disrupt
business to be in an advatange, as well as hacktivists which try to pass through online
firewalls to make political statements.
Most companies have difficulties to manage their capabilities in cyber risk, they lack
on information to make powerful decisions, and the traditional strategies of ”securing
the perimeter” are being insufficient. Most organisations also struggle on quantifying the
impact of risks and mitigation plans. Much of the damage results from an inadequate
response to a breach rather than the breach itself.
This is why that at Portugal Telecom there are several security operations, where each
of them is responsible for different security areas. One of the strategies that PT adopted,
in order to have a resilient cyber protection is to analyse and understand the type of attacks
that an organisation was exposed to. Here is where IntelMQ comes in, this platform has
the capability to collect, deduplicate, classificate, tag and filter Cyber Intelligence events
where a certain organisation was involved.
During this project it was developed a Ruby program capable of configuring IntelMQ
to filter events, according to certain attributes of four different target-entities (organisa-
tions). However, for testing purposes, it was created seven target-entities, for three of
these four entities, it was created extra input data for IntelMQ, provided by the Cyber
Watch operation of Portugal Telecom, making the total of seven target-entities. All four
organisations were scouted and mapped by Maltego, in order to find their public informa-
tion on the Internet. This way, it was possible to find their attributes that were more likely
to suffer an attack, since they are exposed on the Internet.
On the 30-day test accomplished on this project, there were filtered events for four out
of the seven target-entities. As the main goal of this project was the implementation of an
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architecture which filters Cyber Intelligence events, according to certain characteristics of
an organisation, it can be said that this goal was met. Despite three entities had no events.
This does not mean that the filtering did not work for these entities with zero events. If
there were events with one or more attributes of an entity, the event would be filtered
for the corresponding entity. The reason why there were three entities with zero filtered
events, it was because there were no events containing their attributes, which in one hand
is a good sign. It means that these entities did not suffer an attack, or they do not have
vulnerable services or were not involved in malicious activities.
The filtering of Cyber Intelligence events allowed to identify each event, according to
the respective entity, the events after being identified and filtered can be sent to several
analysis platforms allowing a forensic analysis to the event, in order to better understand
what, how and who triggered the event and perfomed the attack.
There is always room for improvements, and this project is no exception to the rule.
There are several aspects that should be taken into account for future work and improve
the filtering of events. Regarding the Ruby program developed for this project, the code
itself should be more dynamic. At the moment, if for some reason it is necessary, for
example, to add another expert-bot to the pipeline that the program generates, it will
be required to update the code, in order for the file pipeline.conf to have the correct
connections between the bots.
To reduce the number of duplicated events, it should be added to the pipeline generated
by ”intelmq configurations generator.rb”, deduplicator-bots after the filter-bots for each
target-entity, this way the number of repeated events would decrease substantially.
Finally, it should be used different tools to scout and map the target-entities, beyond
Maltego. Thus, would be possible to compare results between the different tools, and
create more complete YAML files with the most relevant attributes on the Internet of the
target-entities. In addition, the obtained metadata from Maltego should be converted into
the YAML format automatically, instead of being created manually as happened in this
project.
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Abbreviations
APIs Application Programming Interface. 21
AS Autonomous System. 13
ASN Autonomous System Number. 13
CCI Cyber Counter Intelligence. 9
CERT Computer Emergency Response Team. 23
CIDR Classless Inter-Domain Routing. 13
CINS Cargo Incident Notification System. 29
CnC Command and Control. 28
CPUs Central Processing Unit. 73
CSD CyberSecurity Development and Integration. 20
CSIRT Computer Security Incident Response Team. 23
CTAS Commercial Transform Application Server. 22
CVE Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures. 14
DCY Direc¸a˜o de Cyber Security and Privacy. 1
DGA Domain Generated Algorithms. 28
DNSs Domain Name Server. 19
DoD Department of Defense. 7
DoS Denial of Service. 28
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FQDNs Fully Qualified Domain Name. 4
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FTP File Transfer Protocol. 28
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HTTP Hypertext Transfer Protocol. 14
HUMINT Human Intelligence. 8
ICM IntelMQ Configuration Manager. 5
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IDS Intrusion Detection System. 9
IMAP Internet Message Access Protocol. 28
IOC Indicators of Compromise. 12
IP Internet Protocol. 4
IRC Internet Relay Chat. 28
IT Information Technology. 23
iTDS internal Transform Distribution Server. 22
JSON JavaScript Object Notation. 26
MI Mestrado em Informa´tica. 2
MIME Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions. 14
MX Mail Exchanger. 37
NS Name Server. 37
OSINT Open Source Intelligence. 8
OTX Open Threat Exchange. 28
PEI Projeto em Engenharia Informa´tica. 2
PID Process Identifier. 30
PT Portugal Telecom. 1
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RHEL Red Hat Enterprise Linux. 73
SIEM Security Information and Event Management. 13
SIGHUP Signal Hang Up. 31
SIGINT Signals Intelligence. 31
SIP Session Initiation Protocol. 28
SNMP Simple Network Management Protocol. 29
SOCMINT Social Media Intelligence. 8
SSH Secure Shell. 28
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